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tension between state anti–affirmative action laws and federal antidiscrimination law. Consequently, with seemingly little regard for Title VI federal civil
rights law, public universities have been prone to assume that “affirmative action–less” admissions policies and plunging minority admissions are the inevitable outcome of compliance with state anti–affirmative action laws. At an affirmative action–less university, the river runs dry—the institution virtually
stops admitting certain racial groups and presumes that state anti–affirmative
action laws dictate such a result. This Article challenges this framing. Its
point of departure is to explain how the prominent role of the SAT in selective
college admissions, dictated in large measure by its importance in collegeranking and financial bond-rating systems, creates an incentive for universities
to adopt “minority-deficiency” over “test-deficiency” explanations for racial differences in SAT scores. The Article then endeavors to shift the focus from the
state law anti-“preference” constraints placed on public universities to the federal antidiscrimination constraints that Title VI imposes on the same institutions. It considers whether universities that completely abolish affirmative action to comply with state anti–affirmative action initiatives may actually be
breaking the law with respect to Title VI. To demonstrate this point, this Article
uses statistical tests for identifying Title VI disparate impact—“effect discrimination”—to analyze selective California and Washington public university
admissions cycles after the enactment of anti–affirmative action laws. It finds
racial disparities in admissions to affirmative action–less universities of sufficient magnitude that, if unjustified, could establish that an institution has a
compelling interest in considering race to comply with federal antidiscrimination law. An important conclusion flows from this analysis. State anti–
affirmative action laws may permit the consideration of race if undertaken to
remedy federal “racial effect discrimination.”
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INTRODUCTION
It is simple justice that all should share in programs financed by all, and
directed by the government of all people.
President Lyndon B. Johnson

1

We have demonstrated for decades a steadfast resolve to admit and educate students of all races and ethnicities. . . . Our resolve has not
changed. But the laws under which we operate have changed.
Robert Berdahl, University of California, Berkeley,
2
Chancellor, 1997–2004

Opponents of affirmative action are waging a national battle over
race-conscious admissions through state ballot initiatives like California’s Proposition 209, Washington’s Initiative 200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Nebraska’s Initiative 424. To comply with these new
voter-approved anti–affirmative action laws, public universities have
eliminated their affirmative action policies, and this has had a negative impact on minority admissions rates. At the same time, federal
antidiscrimination law—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its
implementing regulations—prohibits these universities from using selection criteria that have the effect of discriminating against applicants
on the basis of race. Legal scholars have largely ignored this tension
between state anti–affirmative action laws and federal antidiscrimination law. Consequently, with seemingly little regard for federal civil
rights laws, public universities have been prone to assume that “affirmative action–less” admissions policies and plunging minority admissions are the inevitable outcome of compliance with state anti–
3
affirmative action laws.
1

U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION NO. 1, CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL PROGRAMS: AN ANALYSIS OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 5, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/
documents/cr1101968.pdf. President Johnson’s statement regards the rationale for
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2
Pamela Burdman, Lawsuit Against UC Berkeley Claims ‘Color-Blind’ Admissions Policy
is Unjust, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 1999, at A13. Berdahl made this statement on behalf of
the University in response to the filing of a Title VI lawsuit (Rios v. Regents of the University
of California/Castaneda v. Regents of the University of California) by rejected minority applicants after the University of California system ended affirmative action in admissions.
3
Beginning with the passage of the first state anti–affirmative action law in California, public universities in states with such laws have opted to eliminate their racebased affirmative action policies and adopt policies that explicitly prohibit the grant of
positive admissions consideration to racial minorities. After making this dramatic policy shift to “affirmative action–less” admissions, the affirmative action–less universities
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Critics of affirmative action keep the focus on universities’ compliance with state anti–affirmative action laws by pointing to the ad4
mission of minority students with scores on the SAT below the institution’s overall average SAT score as proof of illegal “under the table”
5
affirmative action. This Article makes the point that racial disparities
in admissions have been, on numerous occasions, large enough to
constitute prima facie evidence that affirmative action–less institutions
are violating federal law. The same universities that are regularly accused of violating state anti–affirmative action laws appear to admit so
few racial minorities that the institutions are vulnerable to the polar

not only admit fewer overall numbers of African Americans, Latinos, and other underrepresented minorities, but the rates at which applicants from those racial groups are
admitted have also declined significantly. The year after California enacted its anti–
affirmative action law, admissions rates for African Americans, Latinos, and other underrepresented minorities applying to the most selective universities in California began an extended freefall. Admissions of applicants from those racial groups also declined at Washington’s most selective university after that state’s Initiative 200 took
effect. Commentators have predicted that the elimination of affirmative action will
have a similar negative impact on the admission of African Americans and Latinos applying to Michigan’s most selective public universities. See, e.g., Proposal 2: What Would
it Mean to Public Colleges, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 29, 2006, at 15A (“The [U]niversity
[of Michigan] estimates the combined enrollment of black, Hispanic and American
Indian students would drop from 14% to about 4% to 6% without affirmative action.”).
4
This Article uses “SAT” to refer to the SAT Reasoning Test, formerly named the
SAT I: Reasoning Test. See College Board, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/sat/about/sat/FAQ.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2009). “SAT” was originally an abbreviation for the Scholastic Aptitude Test. Id.
5
For the case of one professor who resigned from the admissions committee due
to suspicion that UCLA was illegally admitting more black students, see, for example,
Heather MacDonald, How UC Is Rigging the Admissions Process, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008,
at A34 (“Officials are perverting the law in a desperate attempt to increase black enrollment.”); Seema Mehta, UCLA Accused of Illegal Admitting Practices, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
30, 2008, at B1; Professor Protests over Black Admissions at U.C.L.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2008, at A16. See also JOHN MOORES, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY ADMISSIONS PROCESS FOR 2002, at 3, 183-214 (2003), available at
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compreview/mooresreport.pdf (compiling newspaper articles regarding “the apparent uneven treatment afforded some applicants”); Richard Sander, Colleges Will Just Disguise Racial Quotas, L.A. TIMES, June 30,
2003, at B11 (arguing that academic programs are “rigging their admissions systems to
admit underrepresented minorities . . . through the back door”). Multivariate regression analysis has also been used to measure the extent to which an applicant’s race impacts her chance of admission. Correlations between the race of applicants, particularly African Americans and Latinos, and increased likelihood of admission are used to
support claims that universities still “prefer” certain races in admissions. Opponents of
affirmative action generally conclude, despite the fact that African Americans and Latinos are admitted at lower rates than other racial groups, that facially affirmative action–less admissions policies are still plagued by racial bias inconsistent with the requirements of state anti–affirmative action laws.
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opposite accusation—that they rely on admissions criteria like the SAT
in a manner that unjustifiably decreases the admissions chances of
minority applicants in violation of federal law. As this Article explains,
the extent to which a university is vulnerable to losing Title VI federal
funds depends in large part upon whether an institution can rebut the
charge that it uses the SAT in a manner that unfairly diminishes the
admissions chances of qualified racial minorities.
In addition to being vulnerable to simultaneous allegations of improperly favoring and disfavoring the former beneficiaries of affirmative action, public universities in states with anti–affirmative action
laws are under intense pressure to use admissions criteria that improve their prestige ranking and financial bond rating. Like highschool students who need high SAT scores to gain admission to top6
ranked colleges or universities, colleges and universities need high
average SAT scores to place well in college-rankings systems like U.S.
7
News & World Report’s “America’s Best Colleges” and to be rated
8
highly by bond-rating systems like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
Because universities with higher overall SAT score averages fare better
9
in both systems, reducing the focus on applicant SAT scores may have
the unwelcome consequence of lowering a top-ranked university’s
prestige standing and financial-strength rating. Thus, this Article considers whether universities could be reluctant to decrease emphasis on
SAT scores even if they are aware that consideration of such scores is
not essential to assessing applicants’ future college performance.
Many other projects that articulate perspectives on the use of race
in higher-education admissions invoke the metaphor of the river. The
image of the river has been used to represent “the flow of talent—
particularly of talented black men and women—through the country’s
system of higher education and on into the marketplace and the lar10
ger society.” The metaphor has also been adopted to describe racial

6

I use the term “top-ranked” to refer to institutions ranked in the highest tier of
the U.S. News & World Report’s list of the “Best National Universities.” See, e.g., Best National Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 1, 2008, at 76, 76-78.
7
See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at
the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 144-45 (2003) (discussing the
importance of the U.S. News & World Report college rankings).
8
See infra Section II.A.
9
See infra Part II.
10
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG -TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS, at xxi
(1998) (detailing the long-term benefits of race-based affirmative action in highereducation admissions).
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minorities as a “transformative” river that challenges “structural and
11
symbolic subordination.” In this Article, the river is the group of African American, Latino, and other minority students who would have
been considered eligible to attend their state’s most selective university under the policies in place prior to the passage of state anti–
affirmative action laws. Before the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws, the most selective universities in California, Washington,
12
and Michigan gave positive admissions consideration to African
13
Americans, Latinos, and other “underrepresented minority” applicants. The elimination of affirmative action to comply with state anti–
affirmative action laws dams the river of such students. This Article
considers whether affirmative action–less universities are potentially
liable under Title VI when the river runs dry.
This Article does not take a position in the important but seemingly intractable normative debate as to the propriety of admitting
11

Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 963 (2001) (critiquing the use of the diversity rationale to defend affirmative action). For other uses of the river metaphor in
this context, see Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000); David B. Wilkins, Rollin’ on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 527 (2000).
12
Nebraska voters approved their state’s new anti–affirmative action law on November 4, 2008. That state’s flagship university—the University of Nebraska at Lincoln—is contemplating changes to its admissions policies. See Matthew Hansen, Affirmative Action: Minority Contracts No Longer Assured, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 26,
2009; Neb. Is Fourth State to Ban Affirmative Action, CMTY. COLLEGE TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008.
13
This Article uses the term “underrepresented minority” as some universities
do—to refer to members of racial groups such as African Americans, Latinos, Filipinos,
and Native Americans that are admitted to and attend colleges and universities in significantly lower proportions than their representation in the general and high-school
populations. In the 1980s, undergraduate campuses in the University of California system began considering race as a factor in admissions to increase the admissions
chances of applicants from these racial groups. See BOB LAIRD, THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 60 (2005) (describing the University of
California, Berkeley’s race-based affirmative action policies targeting “African American, Chicano, Filipino, Latino, and Native American students”). In the mid-1980s, the
University of California, Berkeley phased out affirmative action for Filipinos. Id. at 66;
see also William C. Kidder, Negative Action Versus Affirmative Action: Asian Pacific Americans Are Still Caught in the Crossfire, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 605, 623 n.67 (2006) (noting
that prior to Washington Initiative 200, the University of Washington Law School considered the race of Filipino applicants as an admissions plus factor); cf. Jerry Kang,
Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (exploring how Ronald
Dworkin’s theory justifying affirmative action for certain minority groups can authorize
“negative action” against Asian Americans, such as when a “university denies admission
to an Asian American who would have been admitted had that person been White”).
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students to elite colleges and universities based primarily on quantita14
tive variables like high-school grades and SAT scores. In assessing
the legal implications of the significant declines in the rates of minority admissions since the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws,
this Article does not address whether principles of “substantive equality” require compensation to members of subordinated groups for
15
structural and societal discrimination against them. Likewise, this
Article does not challenge “the fairness or rationality” of admitting
applicants based on predictions of their freshman grade point aver16
age—the conventional approach to selective-university admissions.
Instead, it analyzes whether large disparities in the admissions rates of
different racial groups under affirmative action–less policies expose
universities to liability under Title VI federal civil rights regulations
promulgated to ensure that institutions receiving federal funding do
not discriminate on the basis of race.
This Article has two central conclusions. First, it concludes that
state anti–affirmative action laws do not prohibit race-conscious policies used for the purpose of remedying unjustified racial disparities in
admissions. Second, the Article establishes that whether such racial
disparities in admissions are legally justifiable under Title VI hinges
on a normative assessment—whether SAT scores accurately reflect the
college performance ability of minority applicants who apply to selective public universities. A major implication of these conclusions is
that, although frequently accused of illegally favoring minorities using
“under the table” affirmative action, affirmative action–less universities are admitting so few minorities that the racial disparities in admissions to those institutions establishes a rebuttable legal presumption
of a Title VI disparate impact violation.
Additionally, this Article explains how college-ranking and bondrating systems may drive top-ranked public universities to rely on
17
“educationally insignificant” differences in SAT scores in order to
14

For an exemplary discussion, see Guinier, supra note 7, at 121, who criticizes
“our failure as a society to grapple with the complexity and arbitrariness of our current
normative conceptions of merit.”
15
For examples of effective and poignant critiques of liberal theory and conventional criteria for assessing merit to participate in selective higher education, see Lawrence, supra note 11, at 948-58; Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between
Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1473-81 (1997).
16
Cf. Lawrence, supra note 11, at 954.
17
Title VI regulations permit a federally funded university to use tests that have a
racially discriminatory effect only if the institution can demonstrate that it must rely on
the criterion to achieve a particular educational goal. The Title VI standard mirrors
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boost their institution’s overall SAT score average. It then articulates
the importance of considering whether universities that select from an
applicant pool with highly competitive non-SAT academic credentials—the strongest candidates in the state and, in some cases, the nation—are vulnerable to Title VI challenges because rejected minority
applicants may allege that such institutions rely on the SAT for its
prestige-enhancing capacity, not its capacity to weed out unqualified
applicants.
The major focus of this Article is to make plain that, irrespective
of the prestige enhancement or financial value of using any particular
admissions criterion, universities subject to state anti–affirmative action laws are not exempt from the requirements of Title VI and that
prestige-driven reliance on the SAT may not be an acceptable justification under the Title VI disparate impact standard. Title VI requires
that federally funded universities remedy any unjustified racial disparities caused by reliance on a quantitative variable that decreases
the admissions chances of qualified minority applicants at a higher
18
rate than nonminority applicants. In fact, federal civil rights laws require that institutions receiving federal funds rectify unjustified racially discriminatory impact and explicitly permit the use of affirmative action to do so.
In addition, this Article queries whether race-based admissions
policies that are adopted to remedy potential Title VI violations constitute racial preferences prohibited by state anti–affirmative action
laws. Likewise, it considers whether a rarely explored exception to
state anti–affirmative action laws—the “federal-funding exception”—

the Title VII standard. As an employer charged with violating Title VII may justify the
use of selection criteria that have a racially discriminatory effect on minority job applicants by demonstrating that the use of such criteria is a “business necessity,” universities may justify reliance on admissions criteria that have a racially discriminatory effect
by demonstrating that the use of such criteria is “educationally necessary” to assess the
future college performance ability of student applicants. See infra Section III.B.
18
Universities that use a specific numerical “cut score” for quantitative variables
like SAT score and high school-grade point average (HSGPA) may be liable for violating Title VI even if race-based affirmative action results in a “bottom line” free of racially discriminatory impact. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982). Accordingly, the analysis in this Article is applicable to universities that are not bound by
state anti–affirmative action laws and that use race-based affirmative action as part of a
“multicomponent” admissions process that affords minority applicants the opportunity
to compete equally with nonminority applicants. See Id. (observing that the Court “has
consistently focused on” selection criteria “that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities,” instead of on the “bottom line” or “the overall number of minority or female applicants” actually selected).
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permits the remedial use of affirmative action when universities are
faced with evidence that their affirmative action–less policies result in
19
If so, even in states whose
Title VI racially discriminatory effect.
courts define racial preferences to include race-conscious policies
adopted to correct a Title VI discriminatory impact, universities may
invoke the federal-funding exception to defend the readoption of
race-conscious admissions policies as legally permissible under their
20
state’s anti–affirmative action laws. The major practical implication
of this analysis is that it identifies the requisite factual and legal predicate for considering race to remedy unjustified disparate impact on
minority applicants without running afoul of state anti–affirmative action law.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by describing the
origins of state anti–affirmative action laws and the explicit connection that advocates of such laws make between the goals of the laws
and the antidiscrimination objectives of federal civil rights laws like
Title VI. It also explains the substantive legal requirements of existing
state anti–affirmative action laws, assesses the effect that “affirmative
21
action–less admissions policies” have on the admissions rates of African American and Latino applicants to highly selective public universities, and highlights the fact that federal civil rights law prohibits recipients of federal funds from admitting minorities at significantly
lower rates than nonminorities without sufficient justification.
Part II sets forth a brief history of the SAT as well as arguments for
and against the use of the SAT to predict the college-performance
ability of applicants. It compares the value and effectiveness of the
SAT as a tool for predicting an applicant’s college performance to the
value and effectiveness of the SAT as a mechanism for enhancing a
public university’s standing in prestige rankings and financial bondrating systems. In addition, this Part explains how a university’s decision to eliminate affirmative action after the passage of a state anti–
affirmative action law can result in racial disparities in overall admissions rates of sufficient magnitude to create a presumption of discrimination against certain racial groups.

19

No court has considered the important question of whether and under what
circumstances a university may invoke the federal-funding exception to state anti–
affirmative action laws.
20
See infra subsection IV.C.2.
21
I use this term to refer to the policies adopted by the California, Washington,
and Michigan public university systems after their states’ respective anti–affirmative
action laws took effect.
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Part III applies the evidentiary standard that federal courts would
use to determine whether a university’s admissions policies violate Title VI regulations under the theory that the institution’s reliance on
an admissions criterion like the SAT has an unjustified racially discriminatory impact on minority applicants. This Part analyzes admissions rates by race at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley) and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) since
California Proposition 209 took effect, and at the University of Wash22
ington since Washington Initiative 200 took effect. The analysis of
admissions rates includes data on applicants with high school grade
point averages (HSGPA) of 4.0 and higher who applied to UC Berkeley during that institution’s first year of affirmative action–less admissions. Part III also identifies admissions cycles since the passage of
current state anti–affirmative action laws for which racial disparities
were of sufficient magnitude to constitute evidence of Title VI “effect
discrimination.” It then articulates the challenges that universities
23
may have in justifying reliance on the SAT as educationally necessary.
Part IV contrasts the “diversity rationale” for race-based affirmative
action in higher-education admissions with the remedial rationale,
examining whether the remedial rationale is available to universities
in states with anti–affirmative action laws who might seek to use racebased measures to avoid Title VI liability. Here, the Article introduces
an analytic framework to be used by the increasing number of state
courts that will be called upon to interpret state anti–affirmative action laws. The antipreference and federal-funding exception provisions of such laws may be reasonably construed by state courts to permit race-based affirmative action for the purpose of eliminating racial
discrimination. In other words, state anti–affirmative action laws may
be interpreted to permit universities to readopt affirmative action for
the remedial purpose of complying with federal antidiscrimination law.
Part V distinguishes the legal constraints that state anti–affirmative
action laws impose on public universities from the normative assessment that those institutions make regarding the capacity of the SAT to
make significant distinctions within a pool comprised of highly qualified applicants. It concludes that state anti–affirmative action laws do
not require universities to “normalize” admitting certain racial groups
22

Because the fall 2008 admissions cycle will be the first complete admissions cycle
under Michigan’s new affirmative action–less policy since Proposal 2 took effect on
December 23, 2006, Part III does not include an analysis of Michigan admissions rates
by race. See infra note 53.
23
See infra Section III.B.

1086

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1075

at significantly lower rates than others. Part V conceives state anti–
affirmative action laws much like a legal default rule to prohibit racebased policies designed to favor minority applicants lacking the ability
to perform well in college. It views this new genre of laws as contemplating circumstances in which the remedial consideration of race
could be legally justified. Thus, this Part explains, instead of turning
solely on the strictures of state anti–affirmative action law, whether racial disparities in admissions warrant the remedial consideration of
race turns on how a university assesses the qualifications of the minority students in its applicant pool.
I. RECKONING WITH THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Proposition 209 generally forbids [race-based] action. But there are exceptions to the rule established by Proposition 209. If the failure to employ [race] would result in ineligibility for a federal program with a loss
of federal funds, . . . Proposition 209 would not preclude it.
Connerly v. State Personnel Board

24

In very important ways, states with anti–affirmative action laws are
a national crucible for examining the potential impact of a future Supreme Court ruling rejecting the diversity rationale for affirmative action in higher-education admissions. To date, California, Washington,
Michigan, and Nebraska have passed laws that prohibit public universities, as well as other state entities, from discriminating or granting
25
preferences on the basis of race. After the passage of these laws, the
public universities in those states adopted policies prohibiting the
26
consideration of race as an admissions criterion. The impact of affirmative action–less policies on minority admissions rates at those in27
stitutions has been dramatic. In some instances, African American
28
and Latino admissions declined to pre–Civil Rights Era lows.
Because this Article goes beyond detailing the effects that state
anti–affirmative action laws and the end of race-based affirmative action have had on admissions to the most selective universities, the focus of this Article is a virtually unexplored inquiry: whether affirma24

112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 39 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e), (h)).
See infra Section I.A (detailing the political and legal campaign against statesponsored affirmative action).
26
See infra note 52 and accompanying text. Universities in Nebraska may soon follow suit. See supra note 12.
27
See infra Section I.C.
28
See id.
25
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tive action–less admissions policies produce such large racial disparities that the magnitude of those disparities constitutes evidence of Title VI discriminatory effect. This Part examines the background, language, and demographic impact of current state anti–affirmative
action laws.
A. Genesis and Future of State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws
29

State anti–affirmative action laws are the product of a political
30
and legal campaign to end state-sponsored affirmative action. The
laws are touted in ballot-initiative voter guides and campaign materials
as a new category of “civil rights laws” modeled on Title VI of the Civil
31
Rights Act of 1964. In November 1996, California became the first
29

This Article does not include Florida’s anti–affirmative action law because of the
numerous ways in which the Florida law’s substance and background differ from other
state anti–affirmative action laws. On November 9, 1999, Florida Governor Jeb Bush
issued Executive Order No. 99-281. Pursuant to Governor Bush’s “One Florida” plan,
the Florida State Board of Education amended the Florida state administrative code to
prohibit racial preferences. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6.002(3)(c), (7) (2008).
The Florida Administrative Code provision states the following: “Neither State University System nor individual university admissions criteria shall include preferences in the
admissions process for applicants on the basis of race, national origin or sex.” Id. at r.
6C-6.002(7). Many have speculated that Governor Bush introduced the One Florida
executive order to blunt plans by California businessman Ward Connerly to place the
controversial, racially charged issue of affirmative action on the ballot at a time when it
could have negatively impacted his brother’s bid for president. See, e.g., Rick Bragg,
Affirmative Action Ban Meets a Wall in Florida: A Businessman’s Campaign Is Unwelcome,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1999, at A16.
30
See LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY 31-57 (2003) (examining several campaigns against affirmative action).
31
See id. at 11 (noting that “the opponents of affirmative action have been able to
deftly utilize the civil rights vocabulary”); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE
L.J. 187, 189 (1997) (noting that Proposition 209 was “[f]ormally denominated the
‘California Civil Rights Initiative’”). See generally Tamar Lewin, Colleges Regroup After Voters Ban Race Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at A1 (detailing the campaign to place
anti–affirmative action initiatives on many state ballots).
The ballot-pamphlet argument in favor of California Proposition 209 made explicit reference to “the historic Civil Rights Act” and said that the initiative was called
the “California Civil Rights Initiative” because it “restates” the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
PETE WILSON ET AL., ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 209 (1996), available at
http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/BP/209yesarg.htm. The pro–Proposition 209 argument provided in the official state voter guide explicitly promised that the state law would not
undermine federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VI:
A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination . . . .
....
. . . Government must judge all people equally, without discrimination!
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state in the nation to adopt a state anti–affirmative action law.

32

Cali-

And, remember, Proposition 209 keeps in place all federal and state protections against discrimination!
....
The only honest and effective way to address inequality of opportunity is by
making sure that all California children are provided with the tools to compete in our society.
Id.
The Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 209 in the official Proposition 209 ballot pamphlet is more explicit in its assertion that affirmative action remains permissible
under the state anti–affirmative action law: “Affirmative action programs that don’t
discriminate or grant preferential treatment will be UNCHANGED. . . . It does NOTHING to any existing constitutional provisions. . . . Anyone opposed to Proposition 209
is opposed to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” DANIEL E. LUNGREN ET AL., REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION 209 (1996), available at http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/BP/
209norbt.htm. Similarly, the argument in favor of Washington Initiative 200 assured
voters that the Washington anti–affirmative action law would not impact current antidiscrimination laws. The ballot pamphlet for voters stated that “Initiative 200 does not
end all affirmative action programs” and that it “prohibits only those programs that use
race or gender to select a less qualified applicant over a more deserving applicant for a
public job, contract or admission to a state college or university.” JOHN CARLSON ET
AL.,
ARGUMENTS
FOR
INITIATIVE
200
(1998),
available
at
http://
www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/wa/state/meas/i200/.
Arguments made by the proponents of Michigan Proposal 2 also identified its central purpose as consistent with federal civil rights laws. See The Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative, http://www.michigancivilrights.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (“Proposal
2 . . . [r]eflects the colorblind language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—because equal
treatment is the essence of civil rights.”). Proponents of the Michigan anti–affirmative
action law also directly linked Proposal 2 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in their arguments contained in the voter guide. See Mich. Civil Rights Initiative Campaign, Official
Ballot Language Proposal 06-02, in LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MICHIGAN, NONPARTISAN MICHIGAN VOTER GUIDE 2006, at 30, available at http://www.lwvmi.org/
documents/LWVGuide06.pdf (“This Initiative mirrors the landmark 1964 Civil Rights
Act and advances civil rights by prohibiting discrimination and preferential treatment
based on race, sex and color.”).
32
First, University of California Board of Regents Resolution Special Policy 1 (SP1) and, next, Proposition 209, made voluntary affirmative action programs illegal under California state law. The University of California Board of Regents adopted Special Policy 1 on July 20, 1995. SP-1 provided, in part, that “[e]ffective January 1, 1997,
the University of California shall not use race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin as criteria for admission to the University or to any program of study.” The Regents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment: Admissions
(SP-1) § 2 (July 20, 1995) [hereinafter UC Regents, SP-1], available at http://
www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compreview/sp1.pdf. In 2001, the Board of Regents rescinded SP-1 but affirmed that University admissions remain subject to Proposition 209. See The Regents of the University of California, Future Admissions, Employment, and Contracting Policies—Resolution Rescinding SP-1 and SP-2, RE-28 (May
16, 2001), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/regents/regmeet/may01/
re28new.pdf.
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fornia Proposition 209, a ballot initiative prohibiting the state from
discriminating or granting preferences on the basis of race, is the
33
model for other state anti-affirmative action laws. Proposition 209
took effect in August 1997; its implementation was delayed by litigation alleging that the state law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. In 1998, two years after the passage of
Proposition 209, a second state anti–affirmative action law, Washing34
ton Initiative 200, was approved by Washington state voters. The text
35
of Initiative 200 is virtually identical to the text of Proposition 209.
After success in California and Washington, the major proponents
of state anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives pledged to reverse the
practical effect of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v.
36
Bollinger by means of an amendment to Michigan’s constitution. In
Grutter, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause permits universities to use race as a
37
factor in admissions, so long as its use is nonnumerical and holistic.
Michigan Proposal 2, another carbon copy of California’s initiative,
38
was approved by Michigan voters in November 2006. Like the California and Washington university systems had done, the University of
39
When
Michigan system eliminated race-based affirmative action.
Proposal 2 took effect, the law school that the U.S. Supreme Court
made the model for race-conscious admissions across the country became an affirmative action–less institution.

33

Proposition 209 provides that “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis or race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education,
or public contracting.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). But cf. Spann, supra note 31, at 207
(noting several ambiguities in the language of Proposition 209).
34
Initiative 200 took effect in December 2006, shortly after its passage in November 2006. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(2) (West 2008).
35
Compare id. § 49.60.400(1) (Initiative 200), with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)
(Proposition 209). Both provisions provide that “[t]he state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of
race . . . in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting.”
36
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
37
See id. at 343-44 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law
School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”).
38
When voters passed Nebraska Initiative 424 in November 2008, Nebraska became the fourth state to adopt a state anti–affirmative action law. Nebraska public universities are in the midst of assessing admissions policies compliance with the new state
law. See supra note 12.
39
See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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The end of affirmative action in higher-education admissions in
40
California, Washington, Michigan, and, possibly, Nebraska may be
the tip of a large anti–affirmative action iceberg. Buoyed by the success of several state ballot initiatives, opponents of affirmative action
have made the state-by-state adoption of anti–affirmative action laws a
central component of their overall strategy to end affirmative action.
In fact, key leaders in the strategy to end affirmative action have announced several other states identified as targets for future anti–
41
affirmative action ballot initiatives. Thus, there is good reason to believe that the number of states with anti–affirmative action laws will
continue to increase. It is also possible that the Supreme Court may
reverse its position on the constitutionality of race-based affirmative
action undertaken by universities to increase racial diversity—the diversity rationale for affirmative action.
The departure of Justice O’Connor—the author of the Grutter
opinion upholding the constitutionality of affirmative action—and
subsequent changes in the Supreme Court’s membership suggest that
a future decision on race-based affirmative action may reject the diversity rationale, which has been the Court’s primary basis for preserving
race-based affirmative action in higher education. In addition, the
Grutter decision itself may contain the seeds of its own destruction:
Justice O’Connor’s language stating the majority’s expectation that,
within twenty-five years, affirmative action will no longer be neces42
sary. Opponents of affirmative action, on and off the Court, interpret this language to impose a twenty-five-year time limit on the avail43
ability of race-conscious admissions. If the Court were to reject the
diversity rationale, selective public universities throughout the country
would likely react by eliminating affirmative action, mimicking the reactions of selective public universities in California, Washington, and
Michigan to the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws. Therefore, the possibility that affirmative action–less universities that admit
minority applicants at significantly lower rates may be liable under Title VI has major implications for higher-education admissions across
the nation.

40

See infra note 52.
Lewin, supra note 31 (reporting that both defenders and opponents of affirmative action agree that anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives “can succeed almost anywhere”).
42
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
43
See, e.g., id. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s holding
that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”).
41
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B. The Structure of State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws
The texts of the current state anti–affirmative action laws are very
similar. One of the four state ballot initiatives, Washington’s Initiative
200, became a statute while the others, Proposition 209, Proposal 2,
and Initiative 424 amended the California, Michigan, and Nebraska
44
constitutions, respectively. The central provisions of all four of the
laws are identical: “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em45
ployment, public education, or public contracting.”
Interestingly and importantly, none of the laws explicitly prohibits
“affirmative action.” In fact, the term “affirmative action” appears nowhere in their text. Each law prohibits racial “discrimination” and ra46
cial “preferences” without defining either term and each law includes a textual exception that makes the central provision inoperate
47
in certain circumstances when federal funding is at stake. All told,
state anti–affirmative action laws do not impose an absolute ban on
48
race-conscious action.
44

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; Neb. Const. art. I, § 30; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2008).
45
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2); Neb. Const. art. I,
§ 30(1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(1). Michigan’s anti–affirmative action law
includes an additional clause with repetitive language explicitly directed at the state’s
public colleges and universities: “The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin
in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26(1).
46
Race-based affirmative action is arguably permissible under these provisions so
long as it does not constitute “discrimination” or “preferential treatment.” See MICH.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, “ONE MICHIGAN” AT THE CROSSROADS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
IMPACT OF PROPOSAL 06-02, at 16-17 (2007) (interpreting Proposal 2 to allow some
forms of affirmative action programs); Cheryl I. Harris, What the Supreme Court Did Not
Hear in Grutter and Gratz, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 711 (2003) (arguing that within the
context of university admissions policies that rely on standardized tests of limited predictive ability, “taking race into account is equalizing treatment” and “a correction for
the use of admissions criteria in which racial preferences are embedded”).
47
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4); Neb. Const. art. I,
§ 30(5); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(6).
48
In addition to the federal-funding exception, current state anti–affirmative action laws include exceptions for certain gender classifications, CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 31(c); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(5); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(3); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.400(4), as well as for existing court orders and consent decrees, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31(d); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(9); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(4); WASH.
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The fact that state anti–affirmative action laws neither prohibit all
race consciousness nor place an absolute ban on racial preferences is
made explicit by the presence of the language that this Article refers
to as the “federal-funding exception.” According to the federalfunding exception, anti–affirmative action laws “do[] not prohibit action that must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, if ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to
49
the state.” A few government entities, including the City and County
of San Francisco, have attempted to employ this exception to defend
50
The federaltheir continued use of affirmative action policies.
funding exception, however, has never been invoked by a public col51
lege or university. Instead of invoking the exception, selective institutions subject to anti–affirmative action laws have simply ceased considering race in admissions. Thus, state anti–affirmative action laws
have had a dramatic impact on the racial demographics of the most
selective public institutions in states with such laws without the inclusion of an explicit textual prohibition against “affirmative action.”
C. Racial Impact on Selective Admissions
In response to the passage of their states’ anti–affirmative action
laws, state university systems typically transform themselves from institutions that use race-conscious admissions policies into what this Arti-

REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(5). All three state anti–affirmative action laws also expressly acknowledge the supremacy of federal law. Each contains a provision stating
that if the law conflicts with federal law, the section shall be implemented “to the
maximum extent” permissible by federal law and the United States Constitution. CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31(h); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(7); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(8); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(9).
49
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(5); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.400(6). The California law is worded slightly differently but without any substantive distinction: “Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action
which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where
ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.” CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 31(e).
50
See, e.g., C & C Constr., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715,
730 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the Sacramento Municipal Utility District’s affirmative action program did not qualify for the federal-funding exception and was thus unconstitutional).
51
The Michigan Civil Rights Commission has identified the federal-funding exception as a potential means of justifying the use of affirmative action after the passage
of Proposal 2 in the employment context but it has made no mention of the exception’s applicability to higher-education admissions. See MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N,
supra note 46, at 27-29.
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52

cle terms affirmative action–less institutions. Because the University
of Michigan’s post–Proposal 2 decision to end its affirmative action
policies and the passage of Nebraska’s Initiative 424 took place more
recently, this Article focuses on the data for affirmative action–less
53
admissions cycles in California and Washington. The impact of the
shift to affirmative action–less admissions at California and Washington universities can be examined based on many years of admissions
data. Generally, the major effect of the end of affirmative action has
been that the most selective public universities have admitted fewer
overall numbers of students from underrepresented racial groups. Significantly for determining whether institutions are complying with Title VI federal civil rights law, affirmative action–less admissions in California and Washington have also led to decreased rates of admission of
54
underrepresented minority applicants.
1. Declining Minority Admissions and Enrollment Numbers
Most commentary on the impact of state anti–affirmative action
laws on public university admissions has focused on the substantial
decline in numbers of underrepresented minority applicants admitted
to and enrolled in the states’ most selective universities. Clearly, this
emphasis is warranted in light of the very large decrease in the number of students from particular racial groups admitted to the most se55
lective universities in states with anti–affirmative action laws.
52

SP-1 eliminated race as an admissions criterion prior to the passage of California Proposition 209. See UC Regents, SP-1, supra note 32; Open Letter from Mary Sue
Coleman, President, Univ. of Mich., & Teresa A. Sullivan, Provost & Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs, Univ. of Mich., to the Univ. of Mich. Campus Cmty.,
Proposal 2 Next Steps (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.umich.edu/pres/
speeches/070110prop2.html (announcing the University of Michigan’s decision to
stop considering race when selecting applicants); see also Zachary Gorchow, California,
Washington Give Clues to Impact of Proposal 2, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 29, 2006, at 2B.
53
Proposal 2 took effect on December 23, 2006. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit lifted a stay granted by the district court to the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State University that would have permitted
the institutions to delay compliance with the new law until mid-2007. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 240 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Audrey
Williams June & Peter Schmidt, Court Tells Michigan Universities To Comply Immediately
with Preference Ban, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 12, 2007, at A25.
54
The rate of admission for a particular racial group is the number of admits
identified within that racial category divided by the number of applicants of the same
race.
55
The reason that the University of California’s decision to prohibit race-based
affirmative action has had minimal impact on admissions to less selective and nonselective universities in that system is likely because affirmative action is typically only
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The most selective California institution, UC Berkeley, admitted
56
fewer than half the number of African American and Latino students
during the first affirmative action–less admissions cycle than that institution had admitted just one year before. In 1998, the number of admitted African American students dropped from 545 to 236, and the
57
number of Latino admits dropped from 1246 to 619. Like the admissions numbers, enrollment numbers for African Americans and
Latinos also declined substantially. The number of enrolled African
American students dropped by more than half under UC Berkeley’s
affirmative action–less admissions policies from 252 to 122 freshmen
58
in a class of over 3000 freshman students, and enrolled Latino stu59
dents declined from 469 to 266.
In 1999, the first year of affirmative action–less admissions at the
University of Washington, that institution also admitted and enrolled
60
smaller numbers of African American and Latino students. During
the first year of post–Initiative 200 admissions, the number of African
American applicants admitted to the University of Washington de61
clined from 254 to 173, and the number of African American freshutilized at highly selective institutions. Cf. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at xxvi
(“Within the realm of higher education, we are concerned only with academically selective colleges and universities. The main reason is that the debate surrounding racesensitive admissions is relevant primarily within these institutions.”).
56
The term “Latino” in this Article refers to individuals identified as either “Latino” or “Chicano” by the University of California. Accordingly, all University of California data labeled “Latino” combines data reported separately by UC campuses as
“Latino” and “Chicano.”
57
UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA APPLICATION, ADMISSIONS AND ENROLLMENT OF CALIFORNIA RESIDENT FRESHMEN FOR FALL
1995 THROUGH 2004, at 1, http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/Flowfrc_9504.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2009). The trends were similar for other underrepresented racial
minorities such as American Indians (the category used in the report), whose admissions numbers also dropped by half from fifty-nine to twenty-seven students. Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. African American enrollment also decreased. Id. As a result, the African
American percentage of overall UC Berkeley freshman student enrollment decreased
from 7.8% to 3.7% and the Latino percentage dropped from 14.6% to 8.0%. Id.
White enrollment at Berkeley was virtually unchanged—28.3% in 1997 and 28.2% in
1998—while Asian enrollment (combining the UC categories of “Asian American” and
“Filipino”) increased slightly from 38.5% to 39.5%. Id.
60
University of Washington Freshman Applications by Year, Ethnicity and Outcome 1 (2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter University of Washington Data]. This
data is based on the latest information available to the University of Washington Office
of Academic Record Management as of August 7, 2008. In this data, the term “Hispanic” is used rather than “Latino.” Admissions and enrollment numbers for Native
American and Pacific Islander students also declined. Id.
61
Id.
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men enrolled declined by one-third—decreasing from 121 enrolled African American students (in 1998) to 81 (in 1999) out of over 4000
62
students. Likewise, between 1998 and 1999, fewer Latino applicants
were admitted—with the number of Latino admits decreasing from
63
377 (in 1998) to 312 (in 1999). The number of Latino students en64
rolled also declined—from 188 students to 131.
2. Declining Rates of Minority Admissions
It is virtually inevitable that ending affirmative action policies designed to increase the representation of “underrepresented” racial
groups would result in the selection of a smaller number of applicants
65
from those racial groups. Yet, Title VI operates on the assumption
that even if racial groups are admitted in smaller numbers, fair and
nondiscriminatory selection processes are expected to result in rela66
tively equal rates of admission for all racial groups. This is significant
62

Id. Accordingly, the African American percentage of overall freshman enrollment declined from 3.0% to 1.9%. Id. The University of Washington increased African American enrollment to 105 for the next admissions cycle in 2000. This increase was
facilitated by the institution’s decision to increase the freshman class by 902 students. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. That decline resulted in a decrease in the Latino percentage of overall
freshman enrollment from 4.6% to 3.0%. Id.
65
The Supreme Court has held that universities may consider the race of applicants in order to admit a “critical mass” of students from racial groups that make up
very small percentages of the overall applicant pool. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
335-36 (2003). Admitting a “critical mass” of racial minorities means admitting underrepresented minorities in sufficiently “meaningful numbers” that they do not feel isolated and are thereby encouraged to participate in the classroom. See id. at 318. The
Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to permit (public) universities that
have a compelling interest in “diversity” to use “narrowly tailored” race-conscious admissions policies that typically operate to admit underrepresented minorities like African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans at higher rates than whites and some
Asian racial groups. See id. at 334.
66
Comparison of admissions rates by race—essentially disparate impact analysis—
can be presented as evidence to prove violations of Title VI as well as other provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 307 (1977) (“[S]tatistics can be an important source of proof in employment discrimination cases, since ‘absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired.’” (quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977))). Title VI prohibits unjustified racial
disparities resulting from race-based affirmative action policies designed to remedy
past or current racial discrimination. See infra Section III.A. Based on the assumption
that all racial groups should have a fair opportunity to participate in federally funded
programs, the fact that a university admits members of one racial group at lower rates
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because certain racial minorities were not only admitted to and enrolled at UC Berkeley in smaller overall numbers under affirmative action–less policies, but African Americans and Latinos were among underrepresented racial groups that were admitted to UC Berkeley at
67
substantially lower rates than other racial groups.
During UC Berkeley’s first post–Proposition 209 admissions cycle
(1998), white and non-Filipino Asian American applicants were admit68
ted at rates of 33.2% and 31.8%, respectively. In contrast, the African American admissions rate of 20.3% and the Latino admissions rate
69
of 20.8% were significantly lower.
The magnitude of the post–
Proposition 209 racial disparity in admissions rates was so great that
African American, Latino, and Filipino students who were denied admission to UC Berkeley in 1998 sued the institution for violating Title
70
VI.

than other races constitutes prima facie proof that the institution’s selection criteria
discriminate on the basis of race. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.
67
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68
Rates of admission for UC campuses were calculated by the author based on
admissions and enrollment data made publicly available by the UC Office of the President. See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 57, at 1.
69
Some Asian American racial groups were admitted at lower rates than African
Americans and Latinos. For instance, the comparable Filipino admissions rate was
19.4%. Id. Filipino Americans were considered officially underrepresented in the
University of California system and Pacific Islanders are considered underrepresented
minorities within the University of Washington system. See, e.g., LAIRD, supra note 13,
at 61 (describing Filipinos as an underrepresented group at Berkeley). It is also worth
noting that the increases in admissions of whites and some Asian American racial
groups do not translate into large increases in white and Asian enrollment relative to
the size of the white and Asian applicant pool. Because African Americans and Latinos
are a very small numerical minority as compared to Whites and Asians in the typical
college applicant pool, ending affirmative action increases the admissions chances of
whites and Asians only marginally. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and
the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046-48 (2002) (concluding that racial preferences do not harm nonminorities as a group in the same
proportion that they benefit minorities).
70
See Complaint at 3, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 2, 1999), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/u_berkley/
Castenada_v._UC_Regents.pdf, settled sub nom. Castaneda v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2003). For information on the settlement, see Press Release,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Settlement Reached in Suit over Discriminatory Admissions Process at UC Berkeley (June 17, 2003), http://www.naacpldf.org/
content.aspx?article=5. When this case was filed in 1999, I was a staff attorney at the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and served as head counsel of the
legal team representing the plaintiffs in this case. This litigation has been the subject
of substantial commentary. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Civil Rights Groups Suing Berkeley over
Admissions Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9 (reporting on a press conference held
by Rios plaintiffs and their attorneys from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
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Like UC Berkeley, the University of Washington admitted African
American, Latino, and other underrepresented minority applicants at
lower rates than white and certain Asian American racial groups under its affirmative action–less policies. During the University of Washington’s first year of affirmative action–less admissions, the University
admitted African Americans (60.9% admissions rate), Latinos (72.4%
admissions rate), Pacific Islanders (69.4% admissions rate), and Native Americans (70.2% admissions rate) at lower rates than it had
71
when affirmative action policies were in place. In contrast, admissions rates for white and non–Pacific Islander Asian American appli72
cants increased to 78.9% and 80.5%, respectively.
As discussed further in Part III, federal courts have held that a
federally funded university must justify admissions practices that select
73
students of different races at significantly different rates. Statistical
calculations of the magnitude of racial disparity in selection rates constitute evidence of racial discrimination by a federally funded educational institution under the Title VI “effect” theory of discrimination.
If, for example, instead of admitting students of all races at close to
equal rates, a university admits African American applicants at a rate
Fund, Inc., the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, the Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund); see also Asian Law Caucus et al., Facts and Fantasies About UC
Berkeley Admissions: A Critical Evaluation of Regent John Moores’ Report, 2 HASTINGS RACE
& POVERTY L.J. 53, 64-67 (2004) (discussing Castaneda’s role in changing UC Berkeley’s
admissions policies); William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-In
Headwinds”: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 131, 187 (2002) (citing Castaneda as an example of disparate impact discrimination); Lawrence, supra note 11, at 946-47 (observing that the Rios litigation “directly
turns the upside down logic of ‘reverse discrimination’ right side up” and posits “a different view of what constitutes equality, a different remedy requested, and, ultimately,
a different conception of justice”); Daria Roithmayr, Left over Rights, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1113, 1127-31 (2001) (identifying the Rios/Castaneda lawsuit as “a specific example of strategic rights in action”); Alan E. Schoenfeld, Challenging the Bounds of Education Litigation: Castaneda v. Regents and Daniel v. California, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L.
195, 210-15 (2004) (“[I]t is evident that Castaneda exerted extraordinary pressure on
the higher education community and spurred them to substantive change.”); Burdman, supra note 2.
71
Rates of admission for the University of Washington were calculated by the author based on admissions and enrollment data provided by the University of Washington. See supra note 60.
72
Id. Calculation of the admissions rate for “Hawaiian Pacific Islanders” based on
the number of such applicants who applied and were admitted shows that Pacific Islanders were admitted to the University of Washington at a substantially lower rate
than “Asian Americans.” See University of Washington Data, supra note 60.
73
See infra Section III.C.
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that is significantly lower than the admissions rates for white appli74
cants, Title VI discriminatory effect analysis becomes relevant. If racial differences in rates of admission to a particular university reach
the magnitude that federal courts deem evidence of Title VI discriminatory effect, Title VI requires that the institution be able to justify the
75
use of the selection criteria that led to the racial disparity. If the university cannot justify the use of a selection criterion that has a racially
discriminatory impact—a criterion that causes admissions rates to diverge from racial parity—the U.S. Department of Justice may find that
institution to be in violation of Title VI disparate impact regulations.
The basic principle underlying the Title VI theory of effect discrimination is that individuals of all races should enjoy equal access to federally funded institutions and services. Accordingly, federal courts
have interpreted Title VI regulations in a manner that has the practical effect of requiring federally funded universities to justify large racial disparities.
D. Racial Disparity in Lieu of Racial Parity in Admissions
Title VI disparate impact theory presumes that “racial parity”—
equal admissions rates for all racial groups—would result if selection
policies were free of race-conscious decision making and there were
no significant disparities in the qualifications of applicants across racial groups. Under a racial parity scenario, there would be little or no
difference between the admissions rates for African Americans, Latinos, whites, and Asian Americans because racial groups would be admitted at equal or close to equal rates. Presumably, racial parity in
admissions rates is the ideal to which both federal antidiscrimination
76
laws like Title VI and state anti–affirmative action laws aspire. If the
difference between the admissions rates of the different racial groups
is of sufficient magnitude, it is a “racial disparity.” The statistical disparity, in and of itself, can be evidence of racial discrimination under
77
the Title VI discriminatory effect theory.
74

The standard that federal courts apply to determine whether a racial disparity in
admissions rates is of legal significance is discussed in Section III.C.
75
As explained in Section III.C, deviations from racial parity can be justified if
there is a “valid necessity” to select based on criteria that result in the underrepresentation of a particular racial group.
76
Again, state anti–affirmative action laws are modeled after Title VI.
77
Of course, Title VI standards apply to applicants of all races. White litigants
frequently allege Title VI claims in federal lawsuits challenging affirmative action, as
Barbara Grutter, Jennifer Gratz, and Allan Bakke have. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
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Since the late 1970s, the typical Title VI race-discrimination
charges levied against top-ranked public universities have been claims
that an institution’s affirmative action policy purposefully discrimi78
nates against white applicants on the basis of their race. But, in
states with anti–affirmative action laws, disproportionate rejection of
minority applicants should shift the focus to the Title VI threat to in79
stitutions. If the racial disparities in admissions rates since the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws are of sufficient magnitude,
they establish the prima facie factual predicate necessary to prove Title VI effect discrimination.
Figures 1 and 2 are visual illustrations of the relative rates of admissions by race before and after the passage of the anti–affirmative
action laws in California and Washington, respectively. The experiences of California and Washington selective public universities reveal
that instead of bringing an end to racial disparities in admissions, racial differences in admissions rate continue to be the norm after the
80
The figures show shifts
passage of state anti-affirmative action laws.
from higher to lower admissions rates for African American and Latino students after the passage of the California and Washington anti–
affirmative action laws.

U.S. 306, 317 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 250 (2003); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978). However, plaintiffs alleging “reverse discrimination” do not invoke the Title VI discriminatory effect theory. They would instead argue that the explicit consideration of race as part of an affirmative action policy constitutes purposeful racial discrimination in violation of Title VI under the
discriminatory intent theory, identical to the standard for establishing a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
78
See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (University of Michigan Law School); Gratz, 539
U.S. 244 (University of Michigan undergraduate); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (UC Davis
Medical School); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 813 (2005) (University of Washington Law School); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001) (University of Georgia); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 95 F.3d 53 (5th Cir. 1996) (University of
Texas Law School). These plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
79
After Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001), that threat is the possibility
that the United States Department of Justice may, either on its own or spurred by
charges filed by rejected minority applicants, find that a publicly funded educational
institution is violating Title VI. See infra Section III.A.
80
The data points in Figure 1 are taken from the UCLA post–Proposition 209 admissions cycles. See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note
57, at 2. The data points in Figure 2 are taken from the University of Washington
post–Initiative 200 admissions cycles. See University of Washington Data, supra note 60,
at 1. Years following the adoption of anti–affirmative action laws are labeled by how
many affirmative action–less cycles have passed.
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Figure 1: California Example of Affirmative Action–Less Admissions
Effect on Freshman Admission Rates by Race
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Figure 2: Washington Example of Affirmative Action–Less
Admissions Effect on Freshman Admission Rates by Race
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In the California example (data from UCLA), there is racial disparity in favor of African American and Latino applicants prior to the
passage of Proposition 209 and racial disparity disfavoring those same
groups after the California anti–affirmative action law went into effect.
When affirmative action was in effect in California, the African American and Latino admissions-rate lines were higher than the white and
non-Filipino Asian American lines. Prior to the passage of Proposition
209 in California, the distance between the African American and Latino admissions lines and white and non-Filipino Asian American lines
shows the impact of giving positive admissions consideration to minority applicants. During the year immediately before the passage of
Washington’s anti–affirmative action law (data from the University of
Washington), 1998, the admissions-rate lines of African American and
Latino applicants were higher than the admissions-rate lines of white
81
and non–Pacific Islander Asian American applicants.
In the first year without affirmative action (“Year 1” on Figures 1
and 2), the admissions-rate lines for African Americans and Latinos
drop in both the California and Washington examples. Far from
bringing equal admissions rates for all races, the end of affirmative action in the California Proposition 209 example shows a very steep decline in both African American and Latino admissions rates. After
both Proposition 209 and Initiative 200 took effect, the African
American and Latino admissions-rate lines and the white and Asian
American lines cross—replacing a racial disparity in admissions rates
favoring African Americans and Latinos with a racial disparity favoring
82
whites and Asian Americans. Hence, affirmative action–less admissions in California and Washington appear to have resulted in racial

81

Washington's most selective public university is less selective than the California
example—it rejects a smaller percentage of applicants. Two years before the end of
affirmative action in Washington, 1997, African American (98.4% admissions rate),
Latino (99.7% admissions rate), white (99.3% admissions rate), and non-Filipino Asian
American (98.3% admissions rate) applicants were admitted at rates close to racial parity.
82
If included in Figure 1, Filipino admissions rates would be lower than or comparable to African American and Latino enrollment and admissions rates and, therefore, substantially lower than the “Asian American” admissions, enrollments and admissions rates depicted in the figures. See UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 57, at 2 (listing admissions data by ethnicity for UCLA from 1995 to 2004).
Similarly, if included in Figure 2, Pacific Islander admission, enrollment and admissions rates would be lower than the “Asian American” enrollment and admissions rates
depicted in the figures. See University of Washington Data, supra note 60 (listing admissions data by ethnicity for the University of Washington from 1998 to 2003).
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disparity disfavoring African American and Latino applicants. Neither anti–affirmative action law resulted in racial parity in admissions.
Federal statutory and constitutional law permits racial disparities if
appropriately justified. However, unjustified racial disparities of great
magnitude—a large distance between the admissions-rate lines on
Figures 1 and 2—may be offered as evidence that a university’s admissions policy violates Title VI’s prohibition against the use of selection
84
criteria that have an unjustified racially discriminatory effect. For instance, were it to be shown that an admissions criterion like SAT score
has a disproportionate negative impact on African American and Latino applicants but is necessary for universities to identify which applicants have the college performance ability to be successful at their institutions, the gap between the admissions rates of African American
and Latino applicants and white and Asian American applicants might
85
be justified under Title VI federal antidiscrimination law. But, if universities rely on SAT scores more than necessary to identify which applicants will be successful at the institutions, Title VI federal antidiscrimination law requires that the institutions either decrease reliance
on the selection criterion that has a racially discriminatory effect or
adopt remedial affirmative action policies to compensate for the un86
justified racial impact. Part II of this Article examines the role of the
SAT as an admissions criterion at highly selective, top-ranked public
universities. It also explains the opposing views as to whether the
SAT’s predictive capacity is strong enough to justify racially disparate
impact caused by its use as an admissions criterion.

83

Whether the magnitude of the racial disparity is sufficient to constitute evidence
of Title VI discriminatory effect is a question of federal law. See infra Section III.C.
84
Selecting applicants from one racial group at less than four-fifths of the selection rate for other racial groups may be used by plaintiffs to prove both purposeful racial discrimination and racially discriminatory effect under Title VI. See infra Section
III.B.
85
In fact, courts have interpreted the Title VI discriminatory effect theory to permit a defendant university to rebut evidence of discriminatory effect by demonstrating
that reliance on a particular selection criterion is “educationally necessary.” See infra
Section III.B.
86
See infra Section IV.B.
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II. EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE SAT IN SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS
Many universities, faced with the problem of having to choose from
among thousands of highly qualified applicants, have adopted practices
that give too much weight to the SAT.
Richard Atkinson, President, University of California, 1995–2003

87

In states with anti–affirmative action laws, the debate over the
fairness and validity of the SAT as an admissions criterion is particularly salient. How a university evaluates the SAT’s precision as a predictor of applicants’ college performance ability is implicated in assessing whether racial disparities in admissions after the elimination of
affirmative action violate the Title VI disparate impact standard. If a
university’s admissions criteria—such as the SAT—are fair and valid
mechanisms for distinguishing amongst the pool of high-school students who apply to that institution, racial disparities in admissions are
simply an accurate reflection of the lesser academic qualifications of
African Americans and Latinos. If the SAT’s predictive capacity is limited but maintaining a high institutional average SAT score is important to the university’s prestige and status, institutions could be accused of overrelying on the SAT in admissions for a “noneducational”
purpose. The primary point of contention between the two contrasting views is whether African American and Latino applicants are disqualified from being educated at top-ranked state universities when
their SAT scores are lower than the average SAT score of white and
some Asian American applicants or lower than the university’s institu88
tional average SAT score.
Under the first view, the operating assumption is that large racial
disparities in rates of admission to an affirmative action–less university
87

Richard C. Atkinson, President, University of California, The 2001 Robert H.
Atwell Distinguished Lecture at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Council on
Education (Feb. 18, 2001), available at http://www.ucop.edu/news/sat/speech.html.
88
Professor Lawrence explains the findings of the authors of Shape of the River as
follows:
[W]hile blacks as a group scored lower than whites as a group on standardized
tests, the difference in these scores did not mean that blacks were unqualified
for the education they received. Bowen and Bok say that the difference in
scores between black and white applicants to these schools is better explained
by the fact that white applicants are spectacularly well qualified than by the assumption that black applicants were not qualified. More than 75% of the
black applicants in the study had higher math SAT scores, and more than 73%
had higher verbal SAT scores, than the national average of white test-takers.
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 941 n.48 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 18-19).
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need no explanation because they track racial disparities in SAT
scores. From this position, the fact that the average SAT score of African American and Latino high-school students is, on average, lower
than the average score of white and Asian American students supports
a presumption that African American and Latino applicants to topranked public universities are not qualified to attend such institu89
tions. This presumption is so strong that the fact that the rate of
admission of African American and Latino applicants may be much
lower than the rate of admission for applicants of other races is rarely
discussed by commentators who accuse institutions of granting admissions preferences to minority applicants in violation of state anti–
90
affirmative action law.
The contrasting view is that selective universities often use SAT
scores in a manner of questionable practical value in assessing student
91
college performance ability. Proponents of this position would likely
reject the conclusion that African American and Latino high-school
students who apply to their state’s flagship university with high grades
but SAT scores below the institution’s average score are unqualified to
attend the university. Adherents to this perspective would also likely
challenge the assumption that racial disparities in rates of admission
to affirmative action–less universities are wholly the result of deficiencies in the academic qualifications of African American and Latino
applicants. Accordingly, the historical basis and rationales for university reliance on the SAT as an admissions criterion are relevant to
evaluating the state and federal legal constraints on the admissions
policies of federally funded, public universities.

89

STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE,
ch. 14 (Touchstone 1999) (1997).
90
See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 408-10 (2004) (arguing that law schools either “‘racetrack’ admissions or add large boosts to black applications”); Vikram Amar & Richard
H. Sander, A Mismatch Effect?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A25 (“[A]ffirmative action . . . enables hundreds of minority law students to attend more elite institutions
than their credentials alone would allow.”). Subsumed within this analysis, there appears to be an assumption that the pool of African American applicants to these institutions is so utterly unqualified that the gap between the admissions rates for these institutions should reflect even lower rates of underrepresented minority admissions and
even larger racial disparities in admissions rates.
91
Such policies do eliminate potential Title VI liability for unjustified exclusion of
minorities based on SAT scores. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982)
(holding that “bottom-line” results neither preclude Title VII plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case nor provide employers with a defense to disparate impact allegations).
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A. University Ranking and Rating Based on Institutional Average SAT Score
In recent years, university leaders have become increasingly critical of the role of the SAT in selective higher-education admissions de92
cision making. In a now-famous speech in which he recommended
the elimination of the SAT as a criterion for admission, University of
California President Richard Atkinson expressed concern that “America’s overemphasis on the SAT is compromising our educational sys93
tem.” What Atkinson did not mention in his speech is the pressure
that prestige rankings and financial-strength rating systems impose on
universities to maximize their institutions’ average SAT scores. In addition to serving as a tool for distinguishing among college applicants,
educational-rating publications use SAT scores to compare colleges
and universities. The fact that an institution’s prestige ranking and
bond rating are tied to its reliance on SAT scores means that institutions concerned about their rankings and ratings have a strong incentive to use SAT scores irrespective of whether the SAT has the capacity
to identify meaningful distinctions between applicants with very strong
94
non-SAT academic credentials.
First published in 1983, the U.S. News & World Report (U.S. News)
rankings began incorporating quantitative statistical categories in
95
1989. The relative weights of the ranking categories, including institutional average SAT score, are periodically adjusted by the publica96
tion at its discretion. Since their first publication, the U.S. News rank-

92

See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Challenge Revives SAT Test Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2001, at A14 (describing former University of California President Richard Atkinson’s
later-revised recommendation that the University of California cease requiring the
SAT).
93
Atkinson, supra note 87.
94
See Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Diversity, Opportunity, and the Shifting Meritocracy
in Higher Education, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 487, 508 (2007) (concluding, based on a literature review, that a main factor leading to the increased reliance on standardized test
scores in college admissions is “selective institutions’ attempts to climb the pecking order in various college ranking systems, such as the U.S. News and World Report and Barron’s, [which tip] the weights placed on student test scores”); Guinier, supra note 7, at
154-55 (explaining that “hard numbers” like SAT scores tend to dominate admissions
decisions because selective colleges and universities “become committed to admitting
mostly those students whose test scores protect the institution’s own rankings”).
95
See Elizabeth F. Farrell & Martin Van Der Werf, Playing the Rankings Game,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 25, 2007, at A11, A14, A16 (describing the development
of the rankings).
96
See id. (noting that “one year’s figures should not be compared with previous
years’ because editors ‘change the methodology every year’”).
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97

ings have been subject to strong criticism. The two most salient critiques of the system are, first, that the U.S. News ranking criteria and
98
weighting of those criteria lack any empirical or theoretical basis,
and, second, that the rankings can be manipulated by “ranksteering”—the practice of making higher-education admissions and administrative decisions in a manner designed to move higher on university
99
ranking lists.
There is strong anecdotal and empirical evidence that the realworld impact of a university’s average SAT score on its U.S. News ranking is significantly greater than the explicit formula weight reported
100
by U.S. News to calculate rankings. Although the U.S. News rankings
formula gives average SAT score an explicit weight of 7.5%, studies
indicate that a university’s mean SAT score affects where institutions
101
fall in the prestige rankings to a much larger degree. Reports of institutional success in “moving up” in the prestige rankings are often
102
linked to increases in an institution’s average SAT score.

97

See, e.g., Nicholas Thompson, Playing With Numbers: How U.S. News Mismeasures
Higher Education and What We Can Do About It, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, at 16, 16
(criticizing the rankings for “push[ing] schools to improve in tangential ways and
fuel[ing] the increasingly prominent view that colleges are merely places in which to
earn credentials”).
98
See NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT’S RANKINGS OF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1997), available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2000/
norc.html (concluding that “the weights used to combine the various measures into an
overall rating lack any defensible empirical or theoretical basis”). The National Opinion Research Center report also notes that many studies indicate that the U.S. News
rankings are “sensitive to relatively small changes in the weighting scheme.” Id.; see also
Theodore P. Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Law School Rankings, 60 SMU L. REV. 493,
508-12 (2007) (demonstrating the unreliability of U.S. News rankings of law schools).
99
See Julie Rawe, The Rankings Revolt, TIME, Apr. 2, 2007, at 49, 50 (describing the
“pernicious” practice of “ranksteering”).
100
See, e.g., Thomas J. Webster, A Principal Component Analysis of the U.S. News &
World Report Tier Rankings of Colleges and Universities, 20 ECON. EDUC. REV. 235, 243
(2001) (“The main finding of this study is that the actual contributions of the 11 ranking criteria examined differ explicitly from the explicit [U.S. News] weighting scheme
because of the presence of severe and pervasive multicollinearity.”).
101
See, e.g., Alon & Tienda, supra note 94, at 498 (stating that their findings about
the weight of the test “may be an underestimation”).
102
Farrell & Van Der Werf, supra note 95, at A14, A16, report that “[o]ver the last
five years, the average SAT score of enrolling first-year students has risen 30 points, to
1219” at Baylor University—a university that moved up the rankings from the unranked third tier to rank 81st among national universities. Further, they noted that
Chapman University improved its U.S. News ranking from 90th to 11th among its peer
institutions by setting a minimum SAT score requirement of 740 and increasing the
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Research relying on regression analyses and simulations indicate
that selective colleges and universities have responded to increased
internal and external emphasis on rankings and ratings by increasing
103
This aptheir emphasis on SAT scores as an admissions criterion.
pears to be a very rational institutional reaction in light of findings
that a university’s average SAT score has greater actual effect on an
institution’s ranking than other higher-weighted ranking criteria because the other non-SAT criteria seem to be greatly impacted by the
104
institution’s average SAT score. The institutional average SAT category is likely multicollinear. If this is true, the U.S. News rankings
could be, in effect, double, triple, or quadruple counting institutional
105
average SAT score criteria in its rankings. Consequently, keeping a
close watch on how an applicant’s SAT score will impact the institution’s average SAT score—a form of ranksteering—has become com106
monplace at selective universities.

minimum score “another 10 or 20 points” each year so that the “minimum SAT score is
now 1050.” Id.
103
See Alon & Tienda, supra note 94, at 498-99 (finding a temporal change in the
weight placed on SAT scores as compared to class rank between 1982 and 1992 and
describing the fact that “test-score weights exceed those for class rank at the more selective institutions, and this gap widened substantially over time” as depicting a “shifting meritocracy”).
104
See J. Fredericks Volkwein & Kyle V. Sweitzer, Institutional Prestige and Reputation
Among Research Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges, 47 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 129, 143
(2006) (“Among all 447 institutions, median SAT score and compensation for full professors, not adjusted for cost-of-living, appear as strong indicators of prestige.”); Webster, supra note 100, at 243 (finding that “when the effects of multicollinearity were explicitly considered,” the institutional average SAT score ranked first as “the most
significant ranking criterion,” while “academic reputation, which is the most heavily
weighted [U.S. News] ranking criterion[,] . . . ranked fourth”).
105
Webster notes that
[t]he importance of [average SAT scores] in explaining the [U.S. News] tier
stems not only from its direct effect on tier rankings but also from its indirect
effect on seven of the remaining ten ranking criteria, including (in descending order) actual graduation rates, predicted graduation rates, retention rates,
alumni contributions, academic reputation, the percentage of enrolled students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school class, and the
acceptance rate.
Webster, supra note 100, at 243 (emphasis added).
106
See Lloyd Thacker, Editor’s Stories I, in COLLEGE UNRANKED 55, 58 (Lloyd
Thacker ed., 2005) (“The groundswell of interest in managing image by improving
rank has also resulted in giving more weight to SAT scores when admitting students,
since a college’s average SAT scores are given significant consideration in determining
its rank.”).
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Average institutional SAT scores are also used by bond-rating
agencies to assess a university’s financial viability. The three major financial rating agencies—Moody’s Investors Service, Standard &
Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings—consider average SAT scores as part of
107
Because it has become increasingly common
their credit analyses.
for colleges and universities to issue bonds to raise money for major
108
expansion projects, many institutions have a very direct financial incentive to try to increase their overall average SAT score. The fact
that average SAT score is used to gauge institutional financial health
as well as prestige encourages admissions officials to place even
109
greater weight on SAT scores as an admissions criterion.
The institutional-level SAT competition has become so intense
that educational leaders analogize the pressure on universities to increase their average SAT score to the pressure on nations to increase
110
their nuclear weapons capability. Like world leaders who recognize
the fatal danger that nuclear armament poses for every nation involved, university leaders complain that the race to increase average
SAT scores poses an incredible danger to the future of higher educa111
So similar is the predicament of university leaders to that of
tion.

107

See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, PUBLIC FINANCE CRITERIA 176 (2007), available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/products/PF_Criteria_Book_2007.pdf
(stating that standardized test scores can “enhance[] a school’s ability to withstand a
decline in demand”); Standard & Poor’s, University of Washington; Lease; Public
Coll/Univ—Unlimited Student Fees, RATINGSDIRECT, Apr. 15, 2008, at 2-3, available at
http://www.washington.edu/admin/treasury/pdfs/S&PReport2008GRB.pdf (assigning
AA+ rating to the University of Washington’s general revenue refunding bonds, series
2008, based on, among other factors, the fact that “[s]tudent quality is good, with average SAT scores for fall 2007 at 1196”); Press Release, Stevens Inst. of Tech., Stevens
Receives “A”s from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investor’s Services with Bond Ratings’ Upgrades (Aug. 12, 1998), available at http://www.stevens.edu/press/pr/
pr019.htm (citing Moody’s report as stating that “S.A.T. scores of 1290 indicate student
quality is high”).
108
See Audrey Williams June, Under the Ratings Agency’s Microscope, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Jan. 27, 2006, at A27 (noting the increasing use of bonds “to finance the
apartment-style residence halls, gleaming fitness centers, and academic buildings that
have cropped up on campuses”).
109
See Bruce J. Poch, Sanity Check, in COLLEGE UNRANKED, supra note 106, at 52.
110
See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 87 (“In many ways, we are caught up in the educational equivalent of a nuclear arms race. We know that this overemphasis on test
scores hurts all involved, especially students. But we also know that anyone or any institution opting out of the competition does so at considerable risk.”).
111
See Rawe, supra note 99, at 49 (noting college presidents’ displeasure with the
rankings system). In fact, university leaders have expressed concern that the K-12 educational system is increasingly focused on skills that correlate to success on the SAT
and other standardized tests at the expense of teaching students the critical-thinking
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nations that they face a fear analogous to the fear of nations that disarmament will make them weak in the eyes of the world; universities
fear that decreasing reliance on SAT scores will weaken their position
in college-ranking systems.
B. Debating Minority Deficiency Versus Test Deficiency
The large declines in African American and Latino admissions to
top-ranked public universities after the passage of anti–affirmative action laws have reinvigorated those who criticize how universities rely
on SAT scores. Central to the debate over the proper role of SAT
scores in selective admissions is whether it is appropriate or accurate
to equate an applicant’s SAT score with her college performance ability. According to the SAT-critical view, using the SAT as the tipping
factor for admissions decisions is not a valid way of distinguishing between candidates at the most qualified end of the minority-applicant
pool. The pro-SAT view is that selective universities appropriately rely
on SAT scores because the scores are the best means of identifying
which applicants will succeed at top-ranked institutions. Which of
these views is correct is a hotly contested issue.
It is also important to note that the persistent and pervasive racial
gap in SAT scores raises the stakes in the debate over how much SAT
reliance is justified. In the midst of disagreement as to the proper
role of the SAT as an admissions criterion, an explanation for the ra112
cial gap in SAT scores remains elusive. Generally, there are two major categories of opposing theories explaining the racial gap in SAT
scores: “minority-deficiency” theories and “test-deficiency” theories.
Minority-deficiency theories accept as given that the racial gap in test
scores measures a true deficiency in minority academic preparedness.
A prominent minority-deficiency theory posits that African Americans
score lower on standardized tests like the SAT because they live in
homes with fewer books and have parents less likely to have attended
113
college and who are less likely to read with them on a regular basis.

and analytical skills that they need to perform well in college and beyond. See generally
PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS (1999).
112
See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (collecting various essays that attempt to explain the racial gap
in test scores).
113
This theory can be described more specifically as a theory of African American
“cultural deficiency.” See Meredith Phillips et al., Family Background, Parenting Practices,
and the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 112,
at 103, 107-08 (discussing the impact of environmental conditions on test results).
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Another theory points to African American youth’s rejection of “acting white” as evidence of a counteracademic culture that depresses Af114
rican American test performance.
Test-deficiency theories, however, posit that the SAT is itself deficient as an academic measurement tool, particularly in predicting the
115
The research of educational
future success of minority applicants.
psychologist Claude Steele has led him to posit a leading testdeficiency theory. Steele’s increasingly significant theory contends
that the racial gap in SAT and other standardized-test scores is the effect of the “stereotype threat” on African American test-takers—
consciousness that the gender, racial, or other demographic group to
which one belongs is expected (stereotyped) by society to perform
116
poorly in a particular milieu. When steps are taken to eliminate the
threat of negative academic stereotypes about African Americans before they take a particular test, the gap between African Americans’

114

See, e.g., Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students’ School Success: Coping with the “Burden of ‘Acting White,’” 18 URB. REV. 176, 176 (1986) (using ethnographic
data to argue that “the fear of being accused of ‘acting white’ causes a social and psychological situation which diminishes black students’ academic effort and thus leads to
underachievement”). But see James W. Ainsworth-Darnell & Douglas B. Downey, Assessing the Oppositional Culture Explanation for Racial/Ethnic Differences in School Performance,
63 AM. SOC. REV. 536, 536 (1998) (rejecting Fordham & Ogbu’s oppositional culture
theory based on analysis of the National Education Longitudinal Study’s data of African American, Asian American, and non-Hispanic white high school sophomores).
115
See, e.g., Kidder & Rosner, supra note 70, at 147-57 (analyzing the disparate impact of the construction of SAT questions); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How
Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 613-15
(1997) (discussing how the stereotype threat influences the standardized-test performance of women and African Americans); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1996) (arguing
that standardized tests are more predictive of parental socioeconomic status and “past
opportunities” than of educational achievement).
116
See Steele, supra note 115, at 619-24. Steele’s theory has been tested and supported by a vast array of empirical research on the impact of stereotype threat on performance. See, e.g., Joshua Aronson et al., When White Men Can’t Do Math: Necessary and
Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 29 (1999)
(finding that “stereotype-threatened white males performed worse on a difficult math
test than a nonstereotype-threatened control group”); Catherine Good et al., Problems
in the Pipeline: Stereotype Threat and Women’s Achievement in High-Level Math Courses, 29 J.
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2008) (proposing “that even among the
most highly qualified and persistent women in college mathematics, stereotype threat
suppresses test performance”); Jeff Stone et al., Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic
Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCYHOL. 1213 (1999) (demonstrating that the
stereotype threat can negatively impact sports performance); Nai Chi Jonathan Yeung
& Courtney von Hippel, Stereotype Threat Increases the Likelihood that Female Drivers in a
Simulator Run over Jaywalkers, 40 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 667 (2008).
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117

and whites’ test scores closes.
Extensive stereotype-threat research
suggests that factors unrelated to the academic preparedness of African American and Latino students could skew standardized test scores
118
in a manner that contributes to the racial gap in SAT scores.
Other test-deficiency theories contend that standardized tests like
the SAT are less useful in predicting the academic success of certain
racial groups because the SAT does not measure the counterdiscrimination and counterstereotype skills that minority students
119
need to be successful in college. Some of these theories also maintain that the SAT is constructed in a manner that disadvantages racial
minorities. For example, trial SAT questions answered correctly by
higher proportions of African Americans and Latinos are less likely to
become bona fide SAT questions than questions answered correctly by
120
white test-takers who have, on average, higher SAT scores.
Identifying the cause of the racial gap in SAT scores is interconnected with determining the proper level of emphasis on the SAT as
an admissions criterion. Absent a definitive explanation of the racial
gap in SAT scores, the minority-deficiency and test-deficiency theories
strongly influence the views of college applicants, universities, and
other significant stakeholders in higher education. If the minoritydeficiency theory is correct, maintaining or increasing current levels
of reliance on SAT scores is in harmony with identifying applicants
most prepared to succeed academically in college. If the testdeficiency theory is correct, however, decreasing reliance on SAT
scores is consistent with, and not a deviation from, basing admissions
decisions on applicants’ academic competence and likelihood of academic success.

117

See Steele, supra note 115, at 614.
See generally Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797
(1995) (suggesting that the stereotype threat itself “may interfere with the intellectual
functioning of [African American] students”).
119
See, e.g., Jairo N. Fuertes & William E. Sedlacek, Using Non-Cognitive Variables to
Predict the Grades and Retention of Hispanic Students, C. STUDENT AFF. J., Spring 1995, at
30 (finding that Hispanic students’ “ability to identify and combat perceived interpersonal and institutional racism” was predictive of their success in college); Terence J.
Tracey & William E. Sedlacek, A Comparison of White and Black Student Academic Success
Using Noncognitive Variables: A LISREL Analysis, 27 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 333, 334 (1987)
(arguing that certain “less intellectual” traits are “highly related to academic success”).
120
Kidder & Rosner, supra note 70, at 153 (arguing that “facially-neutral SAT test
construction will have a strong tendency to eliminate items . . . on which African
Americans and Chicanos outperform Whites”).
118
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Prior to the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws, the nation’s selective universities were permitted, under both state and federal law, to use affirmative action. The Supreme Court has held in
Grutter and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that certain
121
race-based affirmative action is legally permissible. Before state universities in California, Washington, and Michigan ended their racebased affirmative action policies, the positive admissions consideration
afforded to underrepresented minorities pursuant to such policies
counterbalanced the negative impact that the racial gap in SAT scores
would otherwise have had on African American and Latino admissions
122
But, at institutions without affirmative action, nothing counrates.
terbalances the disparate impact of SAT reliance. Therefore, it is of
enhanced significance in states with anti–affirmative action laws
whether the minority-deficiency theory or the test-deficiency theory

121

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
122
This counterbalancing eliminated disparities in the racial composition of the
applicants actually admitted. However, even universities using race-based affirmative
action are vulnerable to Title VI charges that the use of a particular selection criteria
has an unjustified racially discriminatory effect on applicants, regardless of whether
affirmative action eliminates that impact on the “bottom-line” of admissions. See supra
note 91 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Justice Thomas, a staunch critic of racebased affirmative action, was the member of the Court in Grutter who most explicitly
described the manner in which universities have traditionally used affirmative action as
a corrective for the deficiencies in tests like the SAT:
[N]o modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor performance of
blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then attempt to “correct”
for black underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as
to obtain their aesthetic student body. . . . The [University of Michigan] Law
School itself admits that the test is imperfect, as it must, given that it regularly
admits students who score at or below 150 (the national median) on the test.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369-70 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas refused to condone race-conscious admissions because the University of Michigan Law School’s need
to use affirmative action was a “self-inflicted wound[].” Id. at 350. Justice Powell, however, reached a very different conclusion in Bakke regarding the legal significance of
test deficiency. He suggested that the need to use race as a corrective for deficiencies
in a test’s predictive ability may constitute a compelling state interest. See Bakke, 438
U.S. at 306 n.43 (suggesting that racial classification could offset “some cultural bias in
grading or testing procedures”). Professor Tomiko Brown-Nagin has noted, “But for
the University’s heavy reliance upon discriminatory admissions criteria as a sorting
mechanism, the aspirations for diversity and selectivity would not be in tension.”
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Thomas?: The Grutter v.
Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 800 (2005).
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123

explains the racial gap in SAT scores.
Hence, it is valuable to consider how the SAT came to play such a prominent role in highereducation admissions, the history of the SAT as an admissions criterion, and the competing theories as to whether such a role is proper.
1. The Well-Meaning History and Intent of
the SAT in College Admissions
During the 1930s, the President of Harvard University, James Bryant Conant, led the country in adopting the original Scholastic Apti124
Ustude Test (SAT) as a criterion for assessing college applicants.
ing a standardized test to assess the intellectual capacity of college
125
applicants was a radical and egalitarian concept in Conant’s day.
Prior to the use of the SAT, college-admissions officers relied on a
close-knit network of private and elite preparatory school headmasters
to channel the children of America’s aristocracy into higher educa126
Conant believed that using tests designed to measure intellition.
gence and mental aptitude was the means to realizing the “natural ar127
istocracy” advocated by Thomas Jefferson. Pleased that the SAT was
very similar in format to mental-measurement tests developed by the
128
French psychologist Alfred Binet, creator of the first modern intelli129
gence test, Conant decided to use the SAT to award scholarships to

123

See, e.g., Harris, supra note 46, at 711 (arguing that, within the context of university admissions policies that rely on standardized tests of limited predictive ability,
“taking race into account is equalizing treatment” and “a correction for the use of admissions criteria in which racial preferences are embedded”); Sturm & Guinier, supra
note 115, at 957 (claiming that standardized tests such as the SAT and the LSAT have
limited predictive ability).
124
See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
MERITOCRACY 38 (1999) (describing Conant’s move to give scholarships based on SAT
scores due to his belief that the SAT measures natural intelligence); see also Guinier,
supra note 7, at 131-33 (explaining Conant’s goal of providing elite institutions with
merit-based selection criteria); cf. Roithmayr, supra note 15, at 1488-92 (describing the
“racist and nativist” origins of modern standardized tests and their connection to the
eugenics movement). For more on Roithmayr’s claim, see JAMES CROUSE & DALE
TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT 21 (1988).
125
See LEMANN, supra note 124, at 52 (describing Conant’s radical idea to provide
merit-based access to joining the elite governing class).
126
See, e.g., JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION
AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 26-39 (2005) (describing the long
history and regularity of elite private boarding schools sending graduates to Harvard,
Princeton, and Yale).
127
LEMANN, supra note 124, at 42-43.
128
Id. at 17.
129
Id. at 17-18.
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Harvard University. For Conant, the major appeal of the SAT was that
it could be used to select applicants based on their intellectual capacity, without regard to whether they had the economic means to attend
130
elite preparatory high schools.
2. Effectiveness of the SAT in Distinguishing
Amongst Highly Qualified Applicants
The SAT remains such a prominent criterion in college admissions because of its unique capacity to provide a standardized yardstick for comparing students from high schools across the country at
131
In recent
minimal monetary expense to colleges and universities.
years, the most esteemed colleges and universities in the country have
seen an increase in the academic qualifications of high-school appli132
The average SAT scores, HSGPAs, and breadth of extracurcants.
ricular experiences of students applying to selective colleges and uni133
So, while James Conant needed the
versities are at all-time highs.
SAT to help Harvard find intellectual diamonds in the rough who
might not otherwise be discovered, today’s most selective highereducation institutions need the SAT to help them select among a glittering assortment of extremely appealing applicants.
By combining an applicant’s SAT score with his HSGPA, universities typically create a numerical composite index score that admissions
134
officers use to compare and rank applicants quantitatively. A major
ostensible reason that colleges require applicants to take the SAT is
that an applicant’s SAT score offers admissions officers information
that assists them in predicting whether a student is likely to succeed at
their institution. Educational-measurement experts produce institution-specific data about the future success of high-school students by

130

Id. at 38.
See, e.g., ROBERT F. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 119 (2004).
132
See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 29-30 (pointing out that competition
for admission at selective schools has increased dramatically, with SAT scores for both
white and African American applicants continuing upward).
133
Id.
134
The LSAT plays a similar role in law school admissions, with law schools typically placing even greater emphasis on composite scores (derived from LSAT scores
and undergraduate grade point average) than undergraduate institutions. See Linda F.
Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 2 (1997) (noting that undergraduate GPAs and LSAT scores are the criteria most
heavily relied on in admissions decisions).
131
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comparing the entering SAT scores of prior applicants with their firstyear grades during college. Although the HSGPA of applicants are
more predictive of college success (defined by first-year grades) than
are SAT scores alone, many studies have found that relying on a combination of SAT and HSGPA is more predictive than using HSGPA
135
Universities also use the SAT because it serves as a uniform
alone.
measurement tool that offsets concerns about the lack of consistency
in high-school grading criteria and the increasingly common practice
of giving higher grades to students to increase their collegeadmissions competitiveness.
The other major argument in favor of requiring applicants to
submit SAT scores as part of their college applications is that using
SAT scores to evaluate students is extremely efficient. Each year, the
number of applicants to the nation’s most prestigious colleges and
136
universities increases.
Institutions must either increase the size of
their admissions staffs to evaluate the larger numbers of applications
that they receive or devise more efficient means of assessing applicants. Universities can use SAT scores to winnow the pool of qualified
applicants even further based on the assumption that high-school
grades should be augmented by a more objective and more standardized assessment measure.
The SAT also makes assessment of a geographically diverse applicant pool more efficient because it provides a numerical score that
can be used to compare applicants from any high school in any part of
the country. Since the test takers, not universities, bear the direct
costs of the SAT testing system, requiring applicants to submit SAT
scores as well as high-school grades saves money as compared to paying admissions officers to gather information about unfamiliar schools
in unfamiliar geographic locales. Moreover, unlike a student-written
personal statement or listing of extracurricular involvement, SAT
scores can be easily entered into and ranked by a computer at minimal cost to the institution.

135

See, e.g., Saul Geiser & Maria Veronica Santelices, Validity of High School Grades in
Predicting Student Success Beyond the Freshman Year: High School Record vs. Standardized
Tests as Indicators of Four-Year College Outcomes (Ctr. for Studies in Higher Educ., Univ. of
Cal., Berkeley, Research & Occasional Paper Series, CSHE.6.07, June 2007),
http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ROPS.GEISER._SAT_6.13.07.pdf
(presenting study results showing that high-school grades are the best predictor of
four-year college grades).
136
See COLLEGE UNRANKED, supra note 106, at 4.
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a. Predictive Ability of the SAT To Assess College Performance
Critics of the central role that the SAT has come to play in college
admissions question whether the test adds enough real-world predictive value to compensate for its role in decreasing the admissions
chances of members of lower-scoring racial, gender, and socioeco137
nomic groups. Specifically, they question both the outcome that the
SAT is designed to predict—first-year college grades—and what they
138
perceive to be the test’s limited ability to predict that outcome. The
Educational Testing Service (ETS), the manufacturer of the SAT, reports that a high-school student’s SAT score explains approximately
thirteen percent of the variance in first-year college grades, less than
would be explained if universities relied on high-school grades
139
SAT critics point to the ETS’s own studies as well as institualone.
tion-specific studies to support their view, under the common, not
psychometric, usage of the term “predict,” that the SAT adds little
predictive value to admissions decisions and is a weak predictor of
140
graduation rates.
Moreover, critics believe that the SAT has limited value because it
does a worse job than high-school grades alone in predicting grades
141
beyond the first-year of college. This is really a subargument of the
larger criticism that the SAT has no predictive ability to forecast what

137

See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 974 (“It is widely recognized that high
school grades are more predictive of college freshman-year grades than the SAT. Perhaps even more significant is the extremely small increase in predictiveness gained by
using the SAT in conjunction with high school grades.”).
138
See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 22 (1994) (examining the backlash against affirmative action policies and arguing that affirmative action is not “preferential treatment” but instead a means of providing “greater equality of opportunity in a social context marked
by pervasive inequalities”).
139
See REBECCA ZWICK, FAIR GAME?: THE USE OF STANDARDIZED ADMISSIONS TESTS
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 116 tbl.5-2 (2002). Zwick reports the results of an ETS report
that finds an overall correlation of SAT verbal and math with college GPA of 0.36 and
an overall correlation of HSGPA with college GPA of 0.39. The percent of the variation in college GPA is calculated by squaring the SAT correlation of 0.36.
140
See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 971-74 (“Indeed, empirical and statistical evidence suggests that many of those who are excluded based on test results could
perform comparably to those admitted.”). The incremental increase in overall correlation from considering the SAT instead of relying on HSGPA alone is 0.09. ZWICK, supra note 139, 116 tbl.5-2.
141
See, e.g., Geiser & Santelices, supra note 135, 1 (“[HSGPA] is consistently the
best predictor not only of freshman grades in college, . . . but of four-year college
outcomes as well.”).
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is most important—how applicants will perform in real life. They
point to the success of relatively lower-scoring students as compared to
higher-scoring ones and to anecdotal evidence that the SAT has un142
derpredicted the success of many highly successful individuals. The
SAT is also often criticized for its inability to predict success “beyond
college” as well as its demonstrated correlation to the test-taker’s socioeconomic status and parents’ education. Critics also contend that
reliance on the SAT operates to the benefit of the children of the rich
143
and well-educated.
b. Ability of the SAT To Predict Academic Performance of Racial Minorities
Defenders of the SAT and the ETS often respond to allegations
that the SAT is racially biased against minority test-takers by pointing
to studies that show that the SAT “over-predicts” the first-year grades
144
of African American test-takers. This point can be countered by the
145
fact that some institution-specific and longitudinal studies find that
the SAT scores of African American students do a poor job of predict146
ing whether they will graduate from college. At some selective universities, African American students with lower SAT scores are more
likely to graduate than African American students with SAT scores in
147
These findings question how well SAT scores
the highest range.
predict African American graduation rates or the likelihood that African American students will graduate from highly selective institutions.
Studies have also found that for African American students with
equivalent SAT scores, those attending more selective universities are
more likely to graduate than African American students with the same
148
SAT scores who attend less selective universities.

142

See, e.g., John Cloud, Should SATs Matter?, TIME, Mar. 12, 2001 (reporting that
Senator Paul Wellstone’s combined SAT score was “under 800 Combined! Yet he went
on to become a Phi Beta Kappa” and that Rhodes Scholar Bill Bradley had a verbal
SAT score of 485).
143
See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 989 (“[T]he SAT is more strongly correlated with every measure of socio-economic background than is high school rank.”).
144
SACKS, supra note 111, at 267.
145
See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 59-65 (demonstrating that the SAT is generally a poor indicator of African American graduation rates at selective schools).
146
See Gregg Thomson, Is the SAT a “Good Predictor” of Graduation Rates? The
Failure of “Common Sense” and Conventional Expertise and a New Approach to the
Question (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
147
Id.
148
Id.; BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 61.
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C. The Relationship Between Affirmative Action and
the Racial Gap in SAT Scores
The persistence of racial differences in SAT scores even when se149
lecting among applicants with very strong academic credentials puts
the SAT at the heart of the affirmative action debate. A half-century
after Conant revolutionized higher-education admissions by using the
SAT to open higher education to those beyond the economic elite,
critics of the SAT contend that, were it not for affirmative action, the
test would keep the door to the nation’s most selective colleges closed
150
to minority applicants. The net impact may be that institutions give
less weight to the SAT in order to counteract differences in average
SAT scores of categories of applicants—the racial, gender, and socioeconomic gaps in SAT scores. An institution with the goal of admitting students who possess demographic characteristics that coincide
with categorical differences in SAT scores may find it necessary to
consider those characteristics as a positive factor in admissions to
151
In other words, group
counterbalance the impact of SAT reliance.
differences in SAT scores can influence admissions officers to give less
weight to the SAT scores of certain applicants based on whether their
enrollment at the institution would fulfill the institution’s need for
152
particular characteristics among its student body.
In selecting among large pools of applicants, selective universities
base a portion of their admissions decisions on whether a particular
student’s admission will fulfill particular institutional goals. An institution typically seeks to fulfill its needs for students from certain cate153
Decades of analysis of SAT scores
gories for each entering class.

149

See William Julius Wilson, The Role of the Environment in the Black-White Test Score
Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 112, at 434-40. Of course, many
individual female, African American, Latino, economically disadvantaged, and rural
test-takers do score extremely well on the SAT and, thus, have scores higher than the
national SAT average. See also BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 26-31 (providing examples of minority students with exceptional SAT scores).
150
See Strum & Guinier, supra note 115, at 992 (“[R]eliance on [existing methods]
for determining merit screens out a disproportionate number of . . . people of color
who apply for positions.”).
151
A simple example of this would be the decision to consider an applicant’s extraordinary talent as a poet or athlete as an admissions plus factor even if his or her
SAT score fell below the institution’s average SAT score for entering freshmen.
152
See generally COLLEGE UNRANKED, supra note 106.
153
Most universities have institutional priorities that prompt them to admit athletes, students with wealthy parents willing to donate large sums of money to the institution, children of alumni, students from rural as well as urban and suburban geo-
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have shown a variety of group disparities when students are separated
based on certain categories. Specifically, men score, on average, bet154
ter than women; whites and some Asian groups score better than La155
156
tinos and African Americans; the rich score better than the poor;
157
and city dwellers score better than students from rural communities.
Under the U.S. Constitution, this type of “category-conscious” decision making is subject to the strictest level of judicial review if it is
shown to be race based. Unlike most positive admissions considerations based on nonracial categories, the use of a student’s race as an
admissions plus factor is subject to the highest degree of federal judi158
Before state anti–affirmative action laws, universities
cial scrutiny.
with race-conscious affirmative action policies focused on whether
their race-based admissions practices met the Supreme Court’s application of the federal constitutional standard of strict scrutiny.
To date, following the passage of a new state anti–affirmative action law, public universities in states subject to the new anti–
affirmative action laws seem to have chosen to abolish their race-based

graphic areas, poor and middle-class students, male as well as female students, and racial minorities. See generally id.
154
See, e.g., Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 992 n.169.
155
See, e.g., WAYNE J. CAMARA & AMY ELIZABETH SCHMIDT, C. BD. REP. NO. 99-5,
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN STANDARDIZED TESTING AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 2 tbl.1
(1999).
156
See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 71 (2002).
157
See, e.g., SAT Results: Suburbanites Outscore City, Country Dwellers, DAILY REP.
CARD, Aug. 27, 1992.
158
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”). Under strict scrutiny, a university still has the discretion to
consider standardized admissions test scores to varying degrees depending upon the
race of the applicant so long as it does so as part of a holistic, nonnumerical, nonquota-based admissions process. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003)
(“[A] university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual . . . .”). The Court’s rationale for treating
universities’ consideration of race differently from their consideration of nonracial
classifications is that relying on racial classifications is inherently suspect and offensive
to the principle of equal protection. See id. at 333 (discussing how governments are
constrained in how they may draw racial distinctions). In fact, the Court has explicitly
rejected the argument that equal protection requires institutions to adopt the raceneutral approach to increasing racial diversity—decreasing emphasis on standardized
tests scores for all racial groups. See Id. at 340 (rejecting the district court’s suggestion
of decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores
as a race-neutral means of increasing the admissions of underrepresented minorities
because such an approach “would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or both”).
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affirmative action policies without leaving open the option of considering race for the purpose of avoiding potential Title VI liability to
minorities. As a result, the numbers of African American, Latino, and
other underrepresented minority students admitted to these institutions dwindled, and the rate of African American and Latino admis159
sions went from higher than average to lower than average.
The key inquiry of this Article is whether state anti–affirmative action laws permit universities to adopt race-conscious practices if remedial in nature—designed to compensate for admissions disparities that
a university suspects result from invalid use or overuse of standardized
test scores. For institutions with admissions statistics that reveal racial
disparities in admissions of a magnitude that satisfies the Title VI
standard for effect discrimination, anti–affirmative action laws could,
in the appropriate factual circumstances, permit the use of race-based
affirmative action. As Part III explains in greater detail, an institution
that has lower-than-average minority admissions rates and is unable to
justify the degree to which it relies on SAT scores is vulnerable to
charges that its admissions policy violates Title VI disparate impact
regulations. The key factual question would be whether the institution has evidence that the remedial consideration of race is necessary
to avoid Title VI liability.
III. ADMISSION DISPARITIES AS TITLE VI EFFECT DISCRIMINATION
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over
the better qualified simply because of minority origins. . . . What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.160

This Part explains the standard applied by federal courts to determine whether a university’s admissions policies result in a Title VI
racially discriminatory effect—a racial disparity in selection that is sub161
Using acstantial enough to constitute evidence of discrimination.

159

The number of applicants with wealthy parents and parents who attended the
university, special talent admits, and socioeconomic and geographic diversity admits
would likely decline in a similar fashion if the institutions relied heavily on SAT scores
for applicants within those categories.
160
401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
161
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (observing that when
expected results and actual results differ by more than two or three standard deviations, the statistical disparity in selection rates constitutes evidence of a Title VI dispa-
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tual admissions data from the University of California campuses at
Berkeley and Los Angeles and the University of Washington, this Part
applies a “rule-of-thumb” test for identifying racially discriminatory ef162
fect—“the four-fifths rule” —and a more sophisticated chi-square statistical test to the admissions cycles since the elimination of affirmative
action at those institutions. The results of this analysis reveal that the
racial disparities in admissions to affirmative action–less public universities have on numerous occasions been of sufficient statistical signifi163
cance to make a prima facie case of Title VI disparate impact.
Statistical evidence that a university’s admissions policy violates Title VI’s prohibition against effect discrimination could be the basis for
an institution’s decision to readopt race-based affirmative action.
Universities in states with anti–affirmative action laws could reasonably
argue that federal and state law permit remedial consideration of race
in admissions to correct unjustified racial disparities. Title VI federal
antidiscrimination law explicitly requires that institutions receiving
federal funds remedy any unjustified racially discriminatory impact
and, as this Article explains, it is inconsistent with the antidiscrimination language and spirit of state anti–affirmative action laws for state
courts to interpret such laws in a manner that classifies remedial racebased admissions policies—the use of race to comply with federal
164
antidiscrimination law—as a prohibited preference. Moreover, universities with clear statistical evidence that their admissions policies
have a Title VI racially discriminatory effect against minorities have a
strong basis for invoking a little-used provision of state anti–affirmative
action laws—the federal-funding exception—on the reasoning that, as
rate impact). Courts have interpreted Title VI to require that the racial disparity exist
not just within the overall applicant pool but also within the subpopulation of “qualified” applicants. In other words, there is proof of Title VI discriminatory effect if, considering only qualified applicants, the racial disparities are large enough to be statistically significant. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)
(“Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may . . . constitute prima
facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”).
162
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008) (explaining the “four-fifths rule” for adverse
impact).
163
It may have been possible to show statistically significant racial disparities
caused by particular admissions criteria such as the SAT prior to the elimination of
race-based affirmative action based on the Court’s decision in Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982). However, after eliminating affirmative action—a policy that ameliorates the statistical impact of using an admissions criterion that has a disproportionately negative impact on racial minorities—statistical evidence of Title VI discriminatory effect can be found through analysis of overall “bottom line” admissions
outcomes.
164
See infra Part IV.
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outlined below, failure to consider race as a remedy puts their institution at risk of losing Title VI federal funds.
A. Rationale and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Title VI
Effect-Discrimination Standard
As President Johnson explained when the landmark Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was enacted, the rationale for prohibiting race discrimina165
tion in the administration of federally funded programs is simple.
Congress provides “[f]ederal financial assistance” to support various
public and private activities by state and local governments, private institutions, businesses, and individuals in the form of federal grants,
166
“Title VI rests on the
loans, contracts, and other federal support.
power of Congress to fix the terms on which federal funds are made
167
available” to prohibit entities that receive federal funds from engag168
ing in discrimination.
U.S. Department of Education regulations promulgated to enforce Title VI set forth the “specific discriminatory actions” that re169
These regulations—often recipients of federal funds must avoid.
ferred to as “Title VI disparate impact regulations”—state that a
recipient of federal funds may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis170
crimination because of their race, color, or national origin.” A violation of Title VI regulations does not require proof of purposeful

165

See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 5 (“It is simple justice that all
should share in programs financed by all, and directed by the government of all people.”).
166
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
167
Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination—
It Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 943-46 (1990). Watson explains that
the primary purpose of Title VI was to provide a means for dismantling racial segregation in education using Congress’s spending power, id. (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983)), while Congress enacted Title VII pursuant
to its commerce power, id. (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 206 n.6 (1979)).
168
Section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, provides that “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Liability
under Title VI itself is identical to the Federal Equal Protection Clause in its requirement that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
240 (1976) (discussing cases holding that challengers have to show discrimination).
169
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2008) (italics omitted).
170
Id. § 100.3(b)(2).
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171

discrimination. Thus, Title VI disparate impact regulations prohibit
federally funded universities from using selection criteria in a manner
172
that constitutes effect discrimination.
In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court ruled that no private
right of action exists to enforce Title VI disparate impact regula173
Whether rejected minority applicants may bring Title VI eftions.
fect-discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—an approach en174
dorsed by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Sandoval —has not been
175
decided definitively by the Court.
However, even if private enforcement of Title VI regulations is precluded, individuals are still
permitted to file complaints with the U.S. Department of Education
171

See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-95 & n.11 (1985) (explaining
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). In Guardians Ass’n v.
Civil Service Commission, a majority of the Court held that a violation of Title VI required proof of discriminatory purpose, while a different majority held that proof of
discriminatory effect suffices when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued
pursuant to Title VI. 463 U.S. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (detailing the multiple holdings of the Court). Recently, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court assumed that
proof of discriminatory impact was sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Title VI
regulations. 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001) (“[R]egulations promulgated under § 602 of
Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial
groups . . . .”). See also Watson, supra note 167, at 949 (“The issue of whether Title VI
and its implementing regulations proscribe unintentional discrimination with a disproportionate adverse impact has had a tortured history in the Supreme Court.”).
172
Some members of the Court have been critical of this interpretation. They
would limit the reach of Title VI regulations to intentional discrimination. See, e.g.,
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 n.6 (discussing disparate impact regulations and § 601); see
also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 948 n.71 (“Given the bare majority in Guardians and
the change in composition of the Court since the holding of that case, it remains to be
seen whether the Court will continue to defer to the [Department of Education’s]
regulations for implementing Title VI.”).
173
532 U.S. at 293.
174
Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Litigants who in the future wish to enforce
the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983
to obtain relief . . . .”). A plaintiff who sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is alleging a
constitutional tort of sorts because officials have violated her federal civil rights. Id.
175
The rule established by the Court in Gonzaga v. Doe presents a considerable
hurdle to plaintiffs seeking to enforce disparate impact regulations using § 1983. 536
U.S. 273, 287-88 (2002) (discussing only individual entitlements as being enforceable
under § 1983). A number of circuits have rejected Justice Stevens’s approach. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir. 2006) (overruling Loschiavo v.
City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994), and relying on a combined reading of
the Court’s decisions in Gonzaga and Sandoval to hold that a federal regulation such as
the U.S. Housing Act cannot independently create an enforceable § 1983 right); Save
Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that disparate
impact regulations are unenforceable under § 1983); S. Camden Citizens v. N.J. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993,
1010 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).
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Office of Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that an institution’s admissions
176
policies have a Title VI discriminatory effect on the basis of race.
It is the responsibility of the OCR to investigate charges of discrimination filed against educational institutions. If the OCR determines
that a university has violated Title VI regulations, it may refer the charge
to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ is statutorily authorized to file suit against a university for failure to comply with Title VI
regulations. Because federal civil rights enforcement agencies have an
independent responsibility to charge and investigate institutions suspected of failing to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws, the
DOJ and the OCR have the authority and responsibility to investigate a
university for failing to comply with Title VI and its regulations even in
177
the absence of a complaint from a rejected applicant.
B. The Theory Underlying Title VI Racial Effect Discrimination
The theory of discriminatory effect as a form of racial discrimination was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
178
In Griggs, African American employees sued the Duke Power
Co.
Company, alleging that the institution of a new high-school-diploma
requirement and general-intelligence-test score cutoff as selection cri179
The Court recogteria constituted employment discrimination.
nized that the criteria’s disproportionately negative effect on African
American job applicants was “directly traceable to” state-sanctioned
discrimination in educational opportunities. The Court held that the

176

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND RESOLUTION OF COMPLAINTS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VI AND
OTHER NONDISCRIMINATION STATUTES (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
cor/Pubs/manuals/complain.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL
104-05 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf; U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Educ. Opportunities Section, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/faq.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). A class of “minorities and
women qualified for graduate school admission” filed an OCR complaint accusing the
University of California of violating Title VI and Title IX disparate impact regulations
after eliminating race- and gender-based affirmative action pursuant to UC Regents
Resolution SP-1. Letter from Cal. Women’s Law Ctr., Equal Rights Advocates, Mexican
Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, and NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., to Stefan
Rosenzweig, Regional Director, Office of Civil Rights, Region IX, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(Mar. 19, 1997) (on file with author).
177
See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2008) (detailing prohibited discrimination).
178
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
179
The intelligence-test requirement was added on the same day that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which required that employers cease race discrimination
in employment, took effect. Id. at 427.
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educational discrimination resulted in an unjustified adverse impact
in violation of Title VII because the power plant did not demonstrate
that a high-school diploma and a particular intelligence-test score
180
were necessary to perform the jobs in question at the power plant.
The Court interpreted Title VII, the provision of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 applicable to employment discrimination, to prohibit employers from using facially race-neutral practices that “operate to ‘freeze’
181
Unthe status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”
der this analysis, the use of these selection criteria was illegal because
none of the criteria was a “business necessity”—a criterion vital to as182
sessing an employee’s ability to perform the job.
The Supreme Court’s language in Griggs is instructive in applying
disparate impact theory to minority claims that heavy weighting of
SAT scores as an admissions factor is not an educational necessity.
The Court in Griggs explained that selection tests must be used in a
valid manner—the tests must be able to accurately measure applicant
performance:
Nothing in [Title VII] precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving
these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Congress has not
commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified
simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What
Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person
183
for the job and not the person in the abstract.

To evaluate a rejected minority applicant’s claim that a university relies on the SAT in a manner that constitutes Title VI effect discrimination, federal courts would employ the educational equivalent of the
Griggs analysis.
In order to avoid liability, a university would likely have to justify
the use of the SAT as related to an applicant’s college performance
ability. Specifically, if rejected minority applicants are able to demonstrate that the use of the SAT as an admissions criterion has a racially
discriminatory effect, the onus is on the university either to rebut the
statistical evidence proving discriminatory effect or to convince the
180
181
182
183

Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 436.
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court that the use of the criterion causing the effect is an “education184
ally necessity.”
The Court’s rationale in Griggs suggests that the essence of the business necessity justification is that employers are permitted to rely on a selection criterion that puts minority applicants
disproportionately at a disadvantage if the criterion accurately meas185
Accordures an applicant’s ability to perform the job in question.
ingly, the ability of universities to defend reliance on SAT scores as an
educational necessity will hinge upon what qualifications a highschool student needs to attend a selective public university.
The key factual question is whether reliance on the SAT is necessary to ensure that minority applicants have the requisite college performance ability to attend certain selective public universities in states
186
with anti–affirmative action laws.
Even if courts accept “admitting
only those applicants predicted to have the highest grade point average at the end of their freshman year” as the mission of highly selective public universities—the mission that best justifies relying on the
SAT—judges might be persuaded that the SAT has limited value in assessing college performance ability when the vast majority of an institution’s applicants have stellar academic credentials. More specifically, courts could very well be convinced by expert testimony that
considering SAT scores as well as high-school grades does not add
substantially to institutions’ ability to predict first-year college grades
187
when compared to prediction based on high-school grades alone.
Universities with admissions outcomes that reveal evidence of Title VI racial effect discrimination may also run the risk that courts will
decide that selective institutions rely on the SAT for reasons unrelated
to assessing the college performance ability of applicants. If rejected

184

The exact contours of educational necessity are not perfectly clear. Unlike the
Title VII business necessity standard, courts have had fewer opportunities to develop
what constitutes an educational necessity. To rebut statistical evidence of racial effect
discrimination, a university will need to identify the goals of its admissions policy and
demonstrate a manifest relationship between those goals and the selection criteria resulting in adverse impact. To present objective evidence that a nexus exists between
the admissions criterion and a particular educational goal, it will be necessary for the
university to explicitly identify the goal(s) of its admissions policy. See Cureton v. NCAA,
37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (outlining the requirements of identified legitimate and substantive goals), rev’d on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
185
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (allowing certain disadvantageous selection criteria if
they are “demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance”).
186
This inquiry subsumes the issue of how college performance ability should be
measured. Should it be based on freshman grades, overall college grade point average, graduation rates, postgraduation success, or some other outcome?
187
See supra subsection II.B.2.
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minority applicants have the requisite college performance ability,
one could argue that highly selective universities do not need the SAT
to weed out incompetent applicants, but instead rely on the SAT to
fulfill their institutional desire to have a high overall SAT average in
order to boost their prestige and bond ratings. With the increasing
value placed on a university’s average SAT score by students, alumni,
professors, community stakeholders, and competing institutions
(whose views play an important role in shaping institutional reputation), courts might conclude that a university’s contention that it uses
SAT scores to evaluate student academic skills is a pretext for relying
on the SAT in maintaining top-ranked status.
An accused university could respond that the pressure to perform
well in college rankings is itself an educational necessity that justifies
the disparate impact of the SAT on minority applicants. In such a circumstance, the highly ranked public university would be contending
that it must maintain a high average SAT score to preserve its institutional prestige, much like an employer for whom it is a business necessity to increase profit margins. A high ranking makes an institution
more attractive to students, alumni, faculty, donors, investors, and entities that award public and private research grants. However, it is unclear whether admitting that it had a nonacademic reason for relying
on the SAT—the SAT’s rankings- and prestige-enhancing value—
would suffice as an educational necessity that justifies using an admissions criterion that has Title VI racially discriminatory effect.
In fact, a strong counterargument to a university’s attempt to justify its reliance on the need to remain elite would be that the use of
the SAT to maintain a high institutional average score is not tied to
188
If the underlying
the assessment of individual academic merit.
principle of federal antidiscrimination law is to protect individuals
from being denied opportunities based on nonmeritocratic criteria,
universities could find it difficult to rebut the claims of rejected minority applicants that the use of the SAT is unjustified. In fact, rejected minority applicants could present other admissions criteria, such
as high-school grades, that provide very similar levels of prediction of

188

In fact, a few universities have explicitly acknowledged that the goal of higher
placement in college-ranking systems has created a new admissions need category—
students with stratospherically high SAT scores. Admissions officials and universities
admit that some of these students are admitted solely based on their SAT scores and
that, absent the pressure on the institution to maintain a high average SAT score,
many such students would not be selected based solely on meritocratic principles.
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applicants’ academic potential as “less discriminatory alternatives” to
189
the SAT and rebut the university’s showing of educational necessity.
Some selective public universities, particularly those that regularly
deny admission to hundreds and thousands of qualified applicants of
190
all races, may have difficulty convincing courts that reliance on the
SAT is justified by educational necessity. In those circumstances, the
elimination of affirmative action with continued reliance on the SAT
could expose a university to federal liability under Title VI—even where
the university eliminated affirmative action to comply with a state anti–
affirmative action law. Such a university could be at risk of losing federal funding should federal agencies charged with enforcing federal
antidiscrimination law investigate and conclude that SAT scores add so
little predictive value over high-school grades alone that their use as a
selection criterion has an unjustified racially discriminatory effect on
minority applicants. If racial disparities in admissions outcomes are of
sufficient magnitude to constitute evidence of a Title VI racially discriminatory effect, universities subject to state anti–affirmative action
laws are vulnerable to charges that their admissions practices violate Title VI and place them in jeopardy of losing federal funds.
C. Proving Title VI Effect Discrimination
The legal standard for proving Title VI discriminatory effect is
modeled after the standard set by courts in effect-discrimination cases
in the Title VII employment context. The first requirement for mak-

189

Cf. Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 316 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying the Title VII employment discrimination burden-shifting test by which the plaintiffs are “required to specify an alternative, prove that the alternative [is] equally valid and prove
that the alternative [is] less discriminatory”). This is particularly true if rejected minority applicants demonstrate that the use of the SAT eliminates minority applicants
with other academic qualifications that have been predictors of success of minority applicants in the past. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 61 (finding that the graduation rates of African Americans in the lower SAT score bands increased with the selectivity of the school that they attended); see also Robin Nicole Johnson et al., Ralph J.
Bunche Ctr. for Afr. Am. Stud., Gaming the System: Inflation, Privilege, and the UnderRepresentation of African American Students at the University of California, BUNCHE RES.
REP., Jan. 2008, at 1, 6 (“For example, in the fall of 2007, the average high school GPA
for entering African American freshmen was 4.08. By comparison, entering Asian and
white freshmen posted average GPAs of 4.33 and 4.31, respectively. In other words,
the typical black freshman presented a GPA that was less than three-tenths of a grade
point lower than the one presented by the typical white or Asian freshman.” (footnote
and citations omitted)).
190
Cf. Atkinson, supra note 87 (“America’s overemphasis on the SAT is compromising our educational system.”).
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ing a Title VI disparate impact claim is evidence of a racially discriminatory effect on minority applicants. Effect discrimination is typically
proven by a statistical showing of a significant racial disparity in selec191
tion rates within the qualified applicant pool. In the context of selective higher-education admissions, Title VI effect discrimination may
be established by presenting evidence that a federally funded educational institution utilizes an admissions criterion like the SAT in a
manner that selects qualified minority applicants at significantly lower
192
While there is no single formula for derates than nonminorities.
termining when racial disparities in admissions are so great that mi193
norities can rely upon them to prove racial discrimination, courts
have referred to the four-fifths (or eighty-percent) rule endorsed by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as a rule of thumb
194
for evaluating adverse impact under both Title VII and Title VI.
Racial disparate impact under the four-fifths rule exists when the
rate of selection of applicants of a particular race is less than eighty per-

191

See supra Section III.B.
See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983) (“Title VI
reaches unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination . . . .”); see also, e.g., Bd. of
Educ. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979) (upholding the standard of discriminatory impact); Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 112 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Many cases
have applied [disparate impact] theory to educational institutions and practices.”);
United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the disparate impact test for Title VI cases); Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The plaintiff first must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral practice has a racially disproportionate effect.”), abrogated on other grounds, Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir.
1989), rev’d on other grounds, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793
F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A prima facie case is demonstrated by showing that the
tests have a discriminatory impact on black schoolchildren.”). Next, the defendant
university is given the opportunity to rebut the evidence of discriminatory effect by
demonstrating that the selection criterion that resulted in the admission of disproportionately fewer racial minorities is required by educational necessity. See Larry P., 793
F.2d at 981 n.6 (“In a Title VI case, once a prima facie case has been established the
burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the criteria used are required by educational necessity.”). If the defendant university successfully demonstrates that the racially disparate impact of its admissions policy is educationally justified, the institution
is still liable for violating Title VI if the plaintiff presents a less discriminatory alternative to the challenged criterion. See id. at 983 (refusing to find that the disparate impact was caused by nondiscriminatory factors).
193
See Harris, 444 U.S. at 151 (declining to lay out a prima facie test for disparate
impact); Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 (same).
194
See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 n.4 (1982) (describing the Uniform
Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures adopted by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission).
192
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195

cent (four-fifths) of the rate of selection of applicants of other races.
A number of more sophisticated statistical analyses may also be employed to demonstrate that the racial impact of a particular selection
criterion is sufficiently adverse to be considered prima facie evidence
of racial discrimination. In addition to the four-fifths rule, chi-square
analysis, confidence-interval analysis, and probability distribution
analysis are statistical tests used to demonstrate the adverse impact of
196
Courts rely on the results of such statistical
selection decisions.
analyses to determine whether the success rates for racial groups differ by a statistically significant degree; if such prima facie disparate
impact is established, discriminatory animus should be presumed and
the burden placed on the entity making selections to demonstrate
197
In other words,
that its policies are not racially discriminatory.
courts rely on evidence of statistical significance to determine whether
a rebuttable presumption of race discrimination is appropriate.
To evaluate whether reliance on the SAT in states adopting anti–
affirmative action laws creates a significant discriminatory effect within
the meaning of Title VI, this Part applies the four-fifths test and the
Pearson chi-square statistical test to several years of affirmative action–
less admissions at the most selective universities in California and
Washington. Chi-square analysis tests the likelihood that differences
in selection outcomes are a product of chance. Applying four-fifths
and chi-square analysis to the post–Proposition 209 admissions cycles
at UC Berkeley and UCLA reveals evidence of a statistically significant
racially discriminatory impact on African American applicants for al198
most all of the admissions cycles considered. The exceptions appear
to be admissions cycles at UC Berkeley during which the institution
was a defendant in a Title VI lawsuit filed by rejected minority appli199
cants. The magnitude of racial disparity in UCLA admissions cycles
when African American and Latino admissions rates were compared
to white admissions rates was statistically significant for each of the ten

195

See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008) (detailing the federal four-fifths standard for
adverse impact).
196
See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 111 (analyzing the standard deviation from the mean of
required SAT scores in a discrimination suit brought by African American athletes
against the NCAA).
197
See, e.g., Harris, 444 U.S. at 151 (concluding that once disparate impact has
been established, “the burden is on the party against whom the statistical case has been
made” to rebut the presumption of discrimination).
198
See infra Tables 1-4.
199
See supra note 70.

2009]

State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws and Title VI

1131

200

years following the passage of Proposition 209. When limited to the
pool of 1998 UC Berkeley applicants with very high grades, the racial
disparity in rates of admission remained statistically significant under
201
This analysis reveals a similar impact on Latino appliboth tests.
cants for the majority of affirmative action–less admissions cycles at
202
UC Berkeley and UCLA since the passage of Proposition 209. There
were several University of Washington admissions cycles for which the
racial disparity in admissions rates comparing African Americans and
whites as well as Latinos and whites were statistically significant under
203
chi-square analysis. However, the racial disparity comparing Latino
and white applicants to the University of Washington was not statisti204
cally significant under the four-fifths rule.
205

1. UC Berkeley and UCLA

For the first affirmative action–less admissions cycle following the
passage of Proposition 209, the 1998 cycle, UC Berkeley’s and UCLA’s
admissions rates for African American and Latino applicants dropped
so low compared to the admissions rate for white applicants that the
disparity violated the four-fifths rule. For UC Berkeley, the 33.2%
white admissions rate compared to a 20.3% African American and
20.8% Latino admissions rates. Similarly, at UCLA, the 35.6% white
admissions rate compared to 23.6% African American and 24.5% Latino admissions rates. At both institutions, the African American and
Latino selection rates were less than four-fifths the white rate—
evidence of significant racial disparity according to the four-fifths rule.
Table 1 and Table 2 show four-fifths-rule analyses for the first ten
years of affirmative action–less admissions cycles at UC Berkeley and
UCLA. The admissions cycles for which the African American or Latino admissions rate is less than four-fifths of the white admissions rate
are shaded. Based on comparisons of the African American and white

200

See infra Table 4.
See infra Tables 5-6.
202
See infra Tables 1-6.
203
See infra Table 8.
204
See infra Table 7.
205
The analysis in this section is based upon data made publicly available by the
University of California Office of the President. See UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 57. The data for applicants with HSGPA of 4.0 and higher for
the fall 1998 UC Berkeley admissions cycle is taken from the plaintiffs’ press materials
(on file with author) and the First Amended Complaint, Rios v. Regents of the University
of California, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1999) (No. 99-0525).
201
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admissions rates between 1998 and 2007, six of UC Berkeley’s post–
Proposition 209 admissions cycles resulted in racial disparities that ex206
ceed the four-fifths standard and are thus substantial. For the same
period, four of the UC Berkeley admissions cycles violated the fourfifths rule when the white and Latino admissions rates were compared.

206

Proving unlawful race discrimination under a disparate impact theory requires
presenting statistical evidence that the questioned policy or practice affects persons of
a particular race or ethnicity more harshly than persons of other races or ethnic backgrounds. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). While there is
no rigid formula for establishing disparate impact, “statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial.” Id. at 995.
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Table 1: UC Berkeley Rates of Undergraduate
207
Admission 1996–2007

1998
208
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

White

Afr. Amer.

Lat./Chicano

33.2%
29.9%
30.2%
29.3%
26.9%
26.4%
28.5%
29.4%
24.4%
25.9%

20.3%
28.2%
28.4%
24.9%
22.7%
19.3%
15.4%
19.9%
17.4%
16.9%

20.8%
27.9%
27.5%
26.9%
24.9%
22.9%
20.5%
23.4%
20.3%
19.7%

At UCLA, the differences in African American and white admissions rates were large enough to qualify as racially discriminatory impact under the four-fifths rule in nine of the ten post–Proposition 209
UCLA admissions cycles. The Latino/white disparity in UCLA’s post–
Proposition 209 admissions rates violated the four-fifths rule in six of
the ten undergraduate admissions cycles between 1998 and 2004.

207

Because there are disparities in admissions rates when specific Asian subgroups
are compared (e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos in 1998 is 19.4% whereas the admissions rate for the general category of Asian Americans is 31.8%), whites have been
selected as the group with the highest selection rate.
208
For the four-year period from March 1999 to March 2003, UC Berkeley’s undergraduate admissions policy was the subject of a federal lawsuit alleging that the institution’s admissions policy rejected African American, Latino, and Filipino applicants
in violation of Title VI and its disparate impact regulations. See Consent Decree, Castaneda v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2003), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9743.
The shaded areas in Table 1 are the rates that violate the four-fifths rule. The
1998 African American admissions rate of 20.3% and Latino rate of 20.8% are less than
four-fifths of the 33.2% admissions rate of white applicants. The 2003 admissions rate
of 19.3% for African American applicants is also less than four-fifths of the 26.4% 2003
white admissions rate. Likewise, the 2004 admissions rate of 15.4% for African Americans and 20.5% rate for Latinos, the 2005 admissions rate of 19.9% for African Americans and 23.4% rate for Latinos, the 2006 admissions rate of 17.4% for African Americans and the 2007 admissions rate of 16.9% for African Americans and 19.7% rate for
Latinos are all less than four-fifths of the respective admissions rates for white applicants for those admissions cycles.
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Table 2: UCLA Rates of Undergraduate Admission 1996–2007

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

White

Afr. Amer.

Lat./Chicano

35.6%
29.5%
31.7%
29.0%
24.2%
24.1%
25.8%
28.9%
26.2%
25.3%

23.6%
23.9%
22.0%
21.3%
19.2%
14.5%
12.2%
15.8%
11.5%
17.1%

24.5%
25.2%
25.2%
23.9%
21.5%
19.7%
17.7%
21.1%
18.3%
16.8%

Chi-square analysis of the racial differences in the same admissions outcomes is even more telling. The chi-square analysis of the
post–Proposition 209 cycles at the same institutions shows that there is
an exceptionally high probability of a relationship between admissions
and race (disfavoring African Americans and Latinos) under affirmative action–less admissions. Table 3 analyzes ten admissions cycles
starting after the enactment of Proposition 209 (1998–2007), showing,

209

As discussed supra note 207, whites have been chosen as the group with the
highest selection rate due to the disparities in admissions rates when specific Asian
subgroups are compared (e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos with HSGPAs of 4.0 or
higher in 2002 is 16.5% whereas the admissions rate for the general category of Asian
Americans is 29.9%).
The shaded areas in Table 2 are the rates that violate the four-fifths rule. Examining the 1998 and 2000 admissions rates, African Americans were admitted at rates of
23.6% and 22.0%, respectively, while Latinos were admitted at rates of 24.5% and
25.2%; these figures were less than four-fifths of the white admissions rate of 35.6%
and 31.7%. During the three admissions cycles of 2001 to 2003, the undergraduate
admissions rates of African Americans (21.3%, 19.2% and 14.5%) to UCLA were consistently less than four-fifths of the white admissions rates (29.0%, 24.2%, and 24.1%).
In 2004, the Latino admissions rate of 17.7% was well below the white admissions rate
of 25.8%. The 2004 African American admissions rate far surpassed the standard necessary to constitute a violation of the traditional four-fifths rule. That year, the admissions rate for African Americans of 12.2% was less than 50% of the white admissions
rate of 25.8%. In 2005, the African American admissions rate of 15.8% was almost
50% less than the white admissions rate of 28.9%, and the Latino rate of 21.1% was less
than four-fifths the white rate. Likewise, the 2006 African American admissions rate of
11.5% and the Latino rate of 18.3% as well as the 2007 African American admissions
rate of 17.1% and the Latino rate of 16.8% were all less than four-fifths of the white
admissions rate for those years.
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by race, the actual number of UC Berkeley applicants admitted and
denied, rates of admission, and the number of admits and denials expected if admissions were independent of race. The Table also pre2
sents the Pearson chi-square value (Ȥ ) for a two-by-two contingency
table comparing African American and Latino admissions to admissions of white applicants as well as the probability of the deviation
from expected values occurring by chance (p-value).
By contrasting the number of admissions and denials that would be
expected for African American and Latino applicants as compared to
white applicants (based on their representation in the applicant pool),
the chi-square value and its corresponding p-value explain the likelihood that the racial disparities are due to chance. It is generally accepted that p-values less than 0.05 are statistically significant. For both
UC Berkeley and UCLA, the p-values reflect extremely strong statistical
significance for almost every post–Proposition 209 admissions cycle.
Only two admissions cycles have p-values that do not rise to the level of
statistical significance—the two cycles at UC Berkeley immediately following the filing of a lawsuit charging the institution with discriminat210
ing against underrepresented minorities in violation of Title VI.

210

Thus, the period during which racial differences in UC Berkeley admissions
rates were not statistically significant was the period during which the University was a
defendant in a civil rights lawsuit alleging that the institution had discriminated against
racial minorities in admissions.
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Table 3: Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in Rates
211
of Undergraduate Admission at UC Berkeley
Year

Admits

Denials

Percent
Admitted

Expected
Admits

Expected
Denials

2370

4759

33.2

2240

4889

Afr. Amer.

236

928

20.3

366

788

Race
212

White
1998

White

2370

4759

33.2

2109

5020

Latino

619

2358

20.8

880

2097

White

2558

5994

29.9

2542

6010

Afr. Amer.

293

745

28.2

309

729

Ȥ2

p-value

78.1

 0.0001***

156.3

 0.0001***

1.2

0.2624

4.0

0.0453†

1.6

0.2038

8.0

0.0047**

10.6

0.0011**

7.3

0.0067**

1999213
White

2558

5994

29.9

2517

6035

Latino

728

1884

27.9

769

1843

White

2550

5892

30.2

2531

5911

Afr. Amer.

338

852

28.4

357

833

2000
White

2550

5892

30.2

2488

5954

Latino

885

2329

27.5

947

2267

White

2601

6273

29.3

2551

6323

Afr. Amer.

323

973

24.9

373

923

White

2601

6273

29.3

2538

6336

Latino

995

2702

26.9

1058

2639

2001

211

The degrees of freedom (df ) = 1 for all calculations; p-value refers to the twotailed p-value, the probability that the variation between the actual and expected admissions rates for the racial groups happened due to chance alone. The superscripts
†
indicate whether variation is statistically significant: denotes a p-value  0.1, indicating “marginal statistical significance;” * denotes a p-value  0.05, indicating “statistical
significance;” ** denotes a p-value  0.01, indicating “strong statistical significance;”
and *** denotes a p-value  0.001, indicating “very strong statistical significance.”
Many of the p-values described as “ 0.0001” in this Table are so small that there is a
less than one chance in 1,000,000 that admissions are independent of race.
212
As explained supra note 207, whites were chosen as the comparison group
rather than Asian Americans because the broad category of “Asian Americans” fails to
distinguish between Asian American ethnic groups that may or may not fall within the
category of underrepresented minorities.
213
For the three-year period from March 1999 to March 2003, UC Berkeley’s undergraduate-admissions policy was the subject of the Rios/Castaneda federal lawsuit alleging that the institution’s admissions policy rejected African American, Latino, and
Filipino applicants in violation of Title VI and its disparate impact regulations. See First
Amended Complaint, supra note 205.
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Year

2002

Race

Admits

Denials

Percent
Admitted

Expected
Admits

Expected
Denials

White

2503

6803

26.9

2401

6905

Afr. Amer.

302

1262

22.7

404

1160

White

2503

6803

26.9

2448

6858

Latino

1001

3013

24.9

1056

2958

White

2519

7036

26.4

2424

7131

Afr. Amer.

302

1262

19.3

397

1167

1137

Ȥ2

p-value

40.3

 0.0001***

5.5

0.0185*

35.3

 0.0001***

19.4

 0.0001***

107.6

 0.0001***

103.6

 0.0001***

56.4

 0.0001***

59.2

 0.0001***

44.8

 0.0001***

39.0

 0.0001***

68.5

 0.0001***

85.2

 0.0001***

2003
White

2519

7036

26.4

2414

7141

Latino

1011

3407

22.9

1116

3302

White

2719

6808

28.5

2558

6969

Afr. Amer.

216

1187

15.4

377

1026

2004
White

2719

6808

28.5

2472

7055

Latino

927

3598

20.5

1174

3351

White

2972

7121

29.4

2852

7241

Afr. Amer.

289

1320

19.9

409

1040

2005
White

2972

7121

29.4

2777

7316

Latino

1111

3637

23.4

1306

3442

White

3188

9865

24.4

3073

9980

Afr. Amer.

324

1539

17.4

439

1424

2006
White

3188

9865

24.4

3020

10,033

Latino

1201

4717

20.3

1369

4549

White

3005

8593

25.9

2863

8735

Afr. Amer.

309

1517

16.9

451

1375

White

3005

8593

25.9

2756

8842

Latino

1208

4922

19.7

1457

4673

2007

Eighteen of the twenty p-values for the probability that racial differences in admission to UC Berkeley occur by chance are statistically
significant, with the vast majority registering p-values less than 0.0001,
indicating a very strong degree of statistical significance.
Table 4 analyzes ten admissions cycles at UCLA starting after the
enactment of Proposition 209 (1998–2007), and shows the actual
number of students admitted and denied, the rates of admission, and
the number of admits and denials expected if admissions were independent of race; it also presents the Pearson chi-square value for a
two-by-two contingency table comparing African American and Latino
admissions to admissions of white applicants, and the probability of
the racial disparities in admissions happening by chance.
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Table 4: Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in
214
tax of Undergraduate Admission at UCLA
Year

Admits

Denials

Percent
Admitted

Expected
Admits

Expected
Denials

White
Afr. Amer.

2999
294

5415
953

35.6
23.6

2868
425

White
Latino

2999
969

5415
2991

35.6
24.5

White
Afr. Amer.

3097
313

7403
995

White
Latino

3097
1022

White
Afr. Amer.

Ȥ2

p-value

5546
822

70.4

 0.0001***

2698
1270

5716
2690

154.0

 0.0001***

29.5
23.9

3032
378

7468
930

17.5

 0.0001***

7403
3033

29.5
25.2

2971
1148

7529
2907

26.6

 0.0001***

3289
325

7100
1155

31.7
22.0

3163
451

7226
1029

57.5

 0.0001***

White
Latino

3289
1152

7100
3422

31.7
25.2

3083
1358

7306
3126

63.7

 0.0001***

White
Afr. Amer.

3178
326

7771
1205

29.0
21.3

3074
430

7875
1101

39.8

 0.0001***

White
Latino

3178
1256

7771
4000

29.0
23.9

2996
1438

7953
3818

47.0

 0.0001***

White
Afr. Amer.

2936
337

9198
1420

24.2
19.2

2859
414

9275
1343

21.4

 0.0001***

White
Latino

2936
1310

9198
4790

24.2
21.5

2826
1420

9308
4680

16.8

 0.0001***

White
Afr. Amer.

2959
277

9302
1639

24.1
14.5

2799
437

9462
1479

88.1

 0.0001***

White
Latino

2959
1306

9302
5322

24.1
19.7

2768
1497

9493
5131

48.3

 0.0001***

White
Afr. Amer.

2859
215

8685
1543

24.8
12.2

2668
406

8876
1352

135.0

 0.0001***

White
Latino

2859
1147

8685
5346

24.8
17.7

2564
1442

8980
5051

121.0

 0.0001***

Race
215

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

214

For an explanation of this statistical analysis, see supra note 211.
As discussed supra note 207, whites were chosen as the comparison group
rather than Asian Americans because the broad category of Asian Americans fails to
distinguish between Asian American ethnic groups.
215
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Year

2005

Race

Admits

Denials

Percent
Admitted

Expected
Admits

Expected
Denials

White
Afr. Amer.

3351
266

8225
1420

28.9
15.8

3157
460

White
Latino

3351
1387

8225
5197

28.9
21.1

White
Afr. Amer.

3792
250

10681
1926

White
Latino

3792
1401

White
Afr. Amer.
White
Latino

1139

Ȥ2

p-value

8419
1226

128.7

 0.0001***

3020
1718

8556
4866

135.2

 0.0001***

26.2
11.5

3514
528

10959
1648

222.7

 0.0001***

10681
6246

26.2
18.3

3398
1795

11075
5852

172.9

 0.0001***

3351
374

9910
948

25.3
17.1

3387
338

9874
984

5.8

0.0163*

3351
1424

9910
7014

25.3
16.8

2914
1860

10346
6604

215.0

 0.0001***

2006

2007

All twenty of the UCLA p-values for racial differences in admissions
outcomes are statistically significant. Strikingly, nine of the ten pvalues for the difference in African American and white admission
outcomes and ten of the ten comparisons of the Latino and white
admission outcomes are smaller than 0.0001, indicating there is virtually no chance that the racial disparities are due to “luck of the
216
draw.”
This statistical evidence that UC Berkeley and UCLA post–
Proposition 209 admissions outcomes are statistically dependent on
the variable of race is typical of evidence relied upon by plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie case of Title VI racial effect discrimina217
tion. Even when the analysis is limited to academically qualified applicants, racial disparities in admission remain sufficient in magnitude
to constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination. In other
words, affirmative action–less admissions policies have also resulted in

216

This type of analysis is not designed to explain why admissions and race are dependent variables. Accordingly, after a prima facie case of Title VI effect discrimination has been established, the university has the opportunity to persuade the court that
the selection criteria resulting in racially disparate impact is “educationally necessary”
to identify which applicants have the requisite college performance ability to attend
the institution. See supra text accompanying notes 184-190. In effect, the institution
must demonstrate that African American and Latino high-school students applying to
their institutions are disproportionately less likely to have the requisite college performance ability than white high-school applicants.
217
See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 205 at paras. 5-7.
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lower rates of admission of African American and Latino applicants
218
with the strong academic credential of HSGPA of 4.0 or higher.
Table 5 shows that during the first year of affirmative action–less
admission policies (1998), UC Berkeley admitted African American
and Latino applicants with grade point averages of 4.0 and higher at
lower rates than white and Asian American applicants with the same
grades. The racial disparities in admissions rates violated the fourfifths rule. The admissions rate of 38.5% for African American applicants with HSGPAs of 4.0 and higher is less than four-fifths (79.9%) of
the 48.2% admissions rate for white applicants with HSGPAs in the
same range. The admissions rate of 39.7% for Latino applicants with
HSGPAs of 4.0 and higher is just slightly more than four-fifths
(82.3%) of the 48.2% admissions rate for white applicants with
219
HSGPAs in the 4.0-and-higher range.
Table 5: UC Berkeley Rates of Undergraduate Admission
220
for Applicants with HSGPAs of 4.0 or Higher

1998
218

White

Afr. Amer.

Lat./Chicano

48.2%

38.5%

39.7%

Even if institutions like UC Berkeley and UCLA attempt to rebut statistical evidence of discriminatory effect on the ground that the overall applicant pool is not the
relevant pool for Title VI analysis, courts may be persuaded that the vast majority of the
applicants in the African American and Latino applicant pools to selective public universities, like the overall applicant pool to selective public universities, is overwhelmingly comprised of students who have the requisite college performance ability to attend those public universities. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 30 (observing that
competition for admission to academically selective schools increased so dramatically
between 1976 and 1989 that “even with race-sensitive admissions, the average SAT
score for black matriculants in 1989 was slightly higher than the average SAT score for
all matriculants in 1951”). In addition, like plaintiffs charging that a particular hiring
criterion has the effect of discriminating against job applicants on the basis of gender,
race, religion, or national origin, rejected minority applicants filing charges with the
Office for Civil Rights might choose to present statistical analysis demonstrating that
the use of the SAT as a selection criterion has a racially discriminatory impact on minority applicants with stellar academic credentials. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (noting the relevance of statistics in Title VII cases).
219
Chi-square analysis of this disparity is in fact “very strongly statistically significant.” See infra Table 6, (showing a p-value of less than 0.0001).
220
As discussed, supra note 207, whites have been selected as the group with the
highest selection rate because of significant admissions disparities among Asian subgroups (e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos with GPAs of 4.0 or higher is 31.6%
whereas the admissions rate for the general category of Asian American is 50.6%).
Shaded boxes show disparities in admissions rates large enough to constitute discriminatory impact under the four-fifths rule.
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Table 6 shows that there was a statistically significant disparity disfavoring African American and Latino applicants with high school
grade point averages of 4.0 or better in the first affirmative action–less
221
It includes the
UC Berkeley admissions cycle (the 1998 cycle).
number of 4.0 or better students admitted and denied, the rates of
admission, the number of admits and denials expected if admissions
of applicants with GPAs of 4.0 or higher were not dependent on race,
the Pearson chi-square value, and p-value.
Table 6: Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in Rates
of Undergraduate Admission at UC Berkeley for
222
Applicants with HSGPAs of 4.0 or Higher
Year

Admits

Denials

Percent
Admitted

Expected
Admits

Expected
Denials

White
Afr. Amer.

2185
89

2347
142

48.2
38.5

2164
110

White
Latino

2185
412

2347
626

48.2
39.7

2113
484

Race
223

Ȥ2

p-value

2368
121

8.26

 0.004**

2419
554

24.6

 0.0001***

1998

Based on the p-values in Table 6, there is only a 0.4% chance that
race was not a factor in the higher rejection rate for African American
high-school students with 4.0 and higher HSGPAs than the rate of rejection of white high-school students with those grades. The chance
that race was not a factor in the difference in the admissions outcomes
for Latino students with HSGPAs of 4.0 and higher and white applicants with the same grades is minimal. Like the analysis of the overall
applicant pool, analysis of an even more qualified subset of the applicant pool could be offered as prima facie evidence of a Title VI racial
effect discrimination against African American and Latino applicants
to UC Berkeley and UCLA after the enactment of a state anti–
224
affirmative action law.

221

Only fall 1998 data for applicants with 4.0 and higher HSGPAs is publicly avail-

able.
222

See supra note 211 (explaining the statistical significance values).
See supra note 207 (explaining the selection of whites, rather than Asian Americans, as the comparison group).
224
See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 205, at paras. 3-11.
223
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2. University of Washington
In the first year of affirmative action–less admissions at the University of Washington (the 1999 admissions cycle), admissions rates for African American and Latino applicants dropped lower than the admissions rate for white applicants. In that year, the admissions rate for
white applicants was 78.9%, whereas the admissions rates for African
225
American and Latino applicants were 60.9% and 72.4%, respectively.
Table 7 shows a four-fifths rule analysis of the first nine years of post–
Initiative 200 admissions cycles at the University of Washington.
Table 7: University of Washington Rates of Undergraduate
226
Admission 1998–2007

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

White

Afr. Amer.

Lat./Chicano

78.9%
79.9%
80.7%
70.9%
72.6%
70.2%
69.2%
71.2%
68.8%

60.9%
71.4%
69.1%
62.3%
59.9%
55.7%
49.8%
52.9%
51.8%

72.4%
73.0%
77.5%
69.1%
67.3%
67.3%
62.3%
64.7%
60.6%

Five of the nine post–Initiative 200 admissions cycles violate the
four-fifths rule for identifying racially discriminatory effect when
comparing admissions rates of white and African American applicants.
None of the University of Washington admissions statistics violates the
rule when Latino admissions rates are compared to white rates, however.

225

See University of Washington Data, supra note 60.
See supra note 207 (explaining selection of whites as the group with the highest
selection rate because of intragroup disparities within the Asian American population—e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos in 1998 is 19.4%, whereas the admissions
rate for the general category of Asian Americans is 31.8%).
Shaded boxes show disparities in admissions rates large enough to constitute discriminatory impact under the four-fifths rule. There are no shaded Latino/Chicano
boxes because none of the disparities in admissions rates is large enough to constitute
discriminatory impact under the four-fifths rule.
226
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Table 8: Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in Rates of
227
Undergraduate Admission at University of Washington
Year

Percent Expected Expected
Admitted Admits
Denials

Ȥ2

p-value

1590
62

52.2

 0.0001***

5747
339

1568
72

10.4

0.0013**

79.9
71.4

6114
315

1575
67

13.8

0.0002**

1548
107

79.9
73.0

6115
315

1574
81

11.0

0.0009**

6116
192

1461
86

80.7
69.1

6085
223

1492
55

23.0

 0.0001***

White
Latino

6116
347

1461
101

80.7
77.5

6102
361

1475
87

2.9

0.0902†

White
Afr. Amer.

6204
261

2544
158

70.9
62.3

6170
296

2579
124

14.3

0.0002**

White
Latino

6204
327

2544
146

70.9
69.1

6196
335

2552
138

0.7

0.4062

White
Afr. Amer.

6376
239

2411
160

72.6
59.9

6328
287

2459
112

30.4

 0.0001***

White
Latino

6376
461

2411
224

72.6
67.3

6343
494

2444
191

8.8

0.0031**

White
Afr. Amer.

5994
244

2548
194

70.2
55.7

5934
304

2608
134

41.1

 0.0001***

White
Latino

5994
483

2548
235

70.2
67.3

5975
502

2567
216

2.6

0.1035

White
Afr. Amer.

6017
237

2678
239

69.2
49.8

5929
325

2766
151

78.4

 0.0001***

White
Latino

6017
521

2678
315

69.2
62.3

5965
573

2730
262

16.8

 0.0001***

White
Afr. Amer.

6438
325

2609
289

71.2
52.9

6333
430

2714
184

91.0

 0.0001***

White
Latino

6438
615

2609
335

71.2
64.7

6383
670

2664
280

17.1

 0.0001***

Race

Admits

Denials

White
Afr. Amer.

5774
173

1541
111

78.9
60.9

5725
222

White
Latino

5774
312

1541
119

78.9
72.4

White
Afr. Amer.

6141
235

1548
94

White
Latino

6141
289

White
Afr. Amer.

228

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

227
228

See supra note 211 (explaining the statistical analysis).
See supra note 207 (explaining selection of the comparison group).
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Percent Expected Expected
Admitted Admits
Denials

Race

Admits

Denials

White
Afr. Amer.

6604
324

2989
302

68.8
51.8

6504
424

White
Latino

6604
719

2989
467

68.8
60.6

6517
806

Ȥ2

p-value

3089
202

78.6

 0.0001***

3076
380

32.7

 0.0001***

Several of the racial disparities in the bottom-line admissions outcomes at the University of Washington’s post–Initiative 200 admissions
cycles appear sufficiently large to establish Title VI racially discriminatory effect against African American and Latino applicants. However,
the four-fifths and chi-square analyses reveal that the racial disparities
in admissions at the University of Washington are, in several instances,
smaller than the racial disparities at UC Berkeley and UCLA. This is
particularly true when the Latino admissions rate is compared to the
white admissions rate. University of Washington admissions outcomes
that are neither statistically significant nor violative of the four-fifths
rule would make it difficult for rejected minority applicants to prove
Title VI discriminatory effect.
Since the passage of Proposition 209, racial disparities in admission to UC Berkeley and UCLA have been consistently statistically significant and have always disfavored African American and Latino ap229
The
plicants, including those with very high grade point averages.
racial disparities in admission to the University of Washington since
the passage of Initiative 200 have also consistently disfavored African
Americans and Latinos, but there have been some affirmative action–
less admissions cycles at the University of Washington that do not appear to constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination. Having
applied statistical tests to assess whether admissions outcomes at affirmative action–less universities constitute evidence of Title VI effect
discrimination, this Part concludes that a very significant number of
post–Proposition 209 and post–Initiative 200 admissions cycles resulted in racial disparities of a large enough magnitude to jeopardize
Title VI federal funding received by UC Berkeley, UCLA, and the
University of Washington. The next question to consider is whether
public universities with evidence that their admissions outcomes constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination may, consistently with
state anti–affirmative action law, readopt race-based affirmative action
as a remedial measure.
229

See Tables 3, 4, & 6 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE DUTY TO COMPLY WITH TITLE VI AS A REMEDIAL
RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Congress’ intent to encourage voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VI (and VII, for that matter) has always been a backdrop
to the scheme of evidentiary burdens the federal courts have placed on
litigants pursuant to that legislation.
Wessmann v. Gittens

230

When affirmative action–less admissions policies result in very
large racial disparities in admissions rates, minorities and the DOJ are
positioned to challenge facially race-neutral admissions criteria, such
as the SAT, under the theory that such considerations have an unjustified racially discriminatory effect. This potential Title VI liability—the
prospect that rejected minority applicants will file Title VI complaints
with the OCR and that such charges could result in loss of federal
funding—could give public universities subject to state anti–
affirmative action laws the option of articulating a corrective (remedial) rationale for race-conscious admissions. In other words, state
anti–affirmative action law, like federal constitutional and statutory
law, may permit institutions to use race-conscious admissions policies
for the purpose of lessening racial disparities in admissions rates that
231
constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination.
It is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause permits race-based affirmative action for the purpose of
232
Similarly, Title VI
remedying the effects of race discrimination.
regulations permit federally funded institutions “to take affirmative
action”—a phrase that has been interpreted to mean race-conscious
233
remedial measures—for the same purpose. If a recipient of federal

230

160 F.3d 790, 819-20 (1st Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part)); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
630 n.8 (1987) (discussing the role of voluntary compliance in reaching the goals of
Title VII).
231
It is also important to note that if, in the future, the Supreme Court rejects the
diversity rationale for affirmative action, the remedial rationale may be the only justification for race-conscious admissions available to universities to justify affirmative action.
232
See, e.g., Paganucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(“A voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plan does not violate constitutional
standards if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. A public employer is justified in undertaking an affirmative action program if it does so to remedy
a history of past discrimination.” (citations omitted)).
233
The relevant Title VI regulations provide as follows:
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financial assistance has been found to have “previously discriminated
against persons on the grounds of race, color, or national origin,” Title VI regulations require, as well as permit, the institution to voluntar234
ily adopt a race-based affirmative action policy.
The question raised by the passage of state anti–affirmative action
laws is whether these new laws permit race-based remedial affirmative
action. And, if so, do state anti–affirmative action laws permit such
corrective race consciousness to remedy the effects of disparate impact discrimination? This Part considers whether institutions may use
race-conscious affirmative action to correct racial disparities that constitute evidence of Title VI discriminatory effect, examining the specific context of admissions to selective public universities in states with
anti–affirmative action laws.
A. Diversity as the Default Rationale for Affirmative
Action in Higher-Education Admissions
The major distinction between the remedial and diversity rationales for affirmative action is the identified purpose behind the policy.
Affirmative action policies adopted for the purpose of achieving diver235
If
sity in higher education may be considered “diversity justified.”
the purpose of an affirmative action policy is to correct the effects of

(i) In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously
discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.
(ii) Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race,
color, or national origin.
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6) (2008) (emphasis added).
234
Id.
235
In the Grutter decision and its companion case Gratz, the Court set forth the
parameters for the diversity-justified use of affirmative action in higher-education admissions, noting that policies aiming to promote diversity must still meet the narrowly
tailored requirement. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273-75 (2003) (holding that
the “points” system used in admissions decisions by the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts was “not narrowly tailored to achieve [the]
asserted compelling interest in diversity” because the plan failed to “offer applicants
the [requisite] individualized selection process”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
334 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions scheme
bore “the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan” as the admissions committee considered race or ethnicity “flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant”).
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racial discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court classifies the policy as
236
remedial affirmative action. However, the diversity rationale, not the
remedial rationale, for affirmative action has been the rationale most
frequently invoked by universities since its conception by Justice Pow237
ell in Bakke.
In contrast to the single-Justice opinion in Bakke supporting the
diversity rationale, a five-Justice majority of the Court recognized the
diversity rationale for affirmative action as constitutionally legitimate
238
The Grutter-Bakke diversity rationale is a win-win for uniin Grutter.
versities. Unlike institutions adopting affirmative action pursuant to
the remedial rationale, a university invoking diversity as its justification for considering race in admissions is not placed in the awkward
position of relying on evidence of its own purposeful or disparate im-

236

Professor Charles Lawrence has explained the difference between the remedial
and diversity rationales for affirmative action:
Arguments that focus on past and continuing discrimination against minorities, women and other groups are often called “backward-looking.” They argue for affirmative action to make amends for or to rectify the effects of past
injustices. By contrast, “forward-looking” arguments for affirmative action
make sparing reference to past or current wrongdoing, and instead defend affirmative action as a means to some desirable future goal. The liberal or “diversity” defense [for affirmative action] articulates its purpose as “forwardlooking” . . . .
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 952-53 (footnote omitted).
237
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978). Justice Powell reasoned that the First Amendment afforded universities a unique academic freedom to create a diverse student body so long as race was one of multiple components
of “diversity.” Id. at 312. Universities often rely exclusively on the diversity rationale to
defend the constitutionality of their race-based admissions policies. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 334 (upholding an individualized admissions plan); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275
(striking down a point-based admissions scheme); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law Sch.,
392 F.3d 367, 375-76 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding an individualized plan); Johnson v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001) (striking down
a “mechanical” plan); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that
while the defendant law school invoked a remedial rationale, its arguments relied
more heavily on the diversity rationale), vacated, 95 F.3d 53, 53 (5th Cir. 1996).
238
More recently, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, the Court applied the highest level of scrutiny to the consideration of race in individual K-12 student assignments. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751-54 (2007). Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion invokes diversity to justify race-conscious policies (but not racespecific individualistic decisions) taking into account the racial composition of schools
and neighborhoods in elementary and secondary education on grounds of the school
board’s interest in creating a racially diverse educational environment. Id. at 2797
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy
argues that race should be a component of diversity but that other demographic factors should be considered as well. Id.
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239

pact racial discrimination. Moreover, when selective universities invoke the diversity rationale, those institutions are rarely called upon to
identify explicitly the characteristics that qualify or disqualify minority
applicants. While diversity-justified affirmative action does not eliminate universities’ Title VI liability for using admissions criteria that
have an unjustified racially discriminatory effect, it does obscure the
discriminatory impact of the policy through “bottom-line” admissions
240
Thus, when pracdecisions that seem to favor minority applicants.
ticed by universities prior to the passage of state anti–affirmative action
laws, diversity-justified affirmative action may have ameliorated the racially discriminatory impact of the institution’s reliance on the SAT.
B. Title VI Liability as a Remedial Rationale Under Federal Law
In contrast, if the diversity rationale is unavailable to an institution—as seems to be true currently with respect to noneducational
public entities—the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause permits the government to adopt race-conscious policies under the remedial rationale for affirmative action. Specifically,
the Court has held that a public institution may voluntarily adopt remedial affirmative action policies based on evidence that the entity’s
selection practices violate the civil rights of minority job applicants or
minorities seeking government contracts. In Adarand Constructors, Inc.
241
242
v. Pena and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court explained
the parameters of a public entity’s use of race-based affirmative action.
In these cases, the Court established that a public entity may use affirmative action to correct for the effects of its own discrimination or
the effects of private discrimination in which the public entity is a
243
Considered in concert with Justice
“passive participant.”
239

See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 11, at 956 (“Perhaps the University’s rejection of
the remedial defense can be explained by its concern that by admitting its own discriminatory practices it would expose itself to liability . . . .”).
240
In order to admit a “critical mass” of underrepresented minorities—students
from groups that make up a relatively small proportion of the student population—
diversity-justified affirmative action policies typically admit such minorities at higherthan-average rates.
241
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
242
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
243
Id. at 492; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“The unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups
in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.”); Lawrence, supra note 11, at 955 (using the example of the University of Michigan’s proposed strategy in Grutter of admitting and documenting its
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O’Connor’s analysis in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the
Court’s Adarand and Croson analysis may grant public entities the authority under federal law to “facilitate a voluntary remedy” when nec245
essary to counteract the effects of discrimination.
The Supreme Court and Congress place substantial value on voluntary efforts to further the objectives of federal antidiscrimination
246
In fact, the value is even greater when a public entity acts to
laws.
remedy discrimination, “both because of the example its voluntary assumption of responsibility sets and because the remediation of gov247
ernmental discrimination is of unique importance.” In her concurring opinion in Wygant, Justice O’Connor set forth an explanation for
permitting remedial race consciousness by public employers that
seems equally applicable to public universities. Justice O’Connor interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner designed to solve
the dilemma faced by public employers with some evidence that racebased affirmative action is necessary to avoid violating the civil rights
of racial minorities. She rejected the notion that such employers
could only adopt remedial affirmative action policies if they were willing to admit facts proving that the entities had, in fact, discriminated

own historical and contemporary discrimination); Roithmayr, supra note 15, at 1498
(positing that critical history could be used to show that the current law school admission system is structurally discriminatory and that affirmative action is necessary to
remedy it).
244
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
245
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 820 (1st Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Judge Lipez applied the Adarand and Croson analysis to the selective admissions context. However, he rejected the claims of the plaintiffs and the Boston
School Committee that, absent proof of discriminatory intent, statistical disparities in
admissions rates to the selective Boston Latin Examination High School constituted a
compelling justification for use of race-based affirmative action. Id. at 817.
246
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that it should not be necessary for public employers to prove
their own discriminatory behavior in order to take remedial action and that forcing
public employers to make findings of past discrimination would be contrary to the expressed desire of the Supreme Court and Congress to encourage voluntary efforts); see
also Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power:
A Neo-Federalist Challenge to State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129,
140 (1999) (“Supreme Court doctrine allows the political branches of the local, state
and federal government to adopt race-conscious measures without having to admit
that they themselves discriminated in the past.”).
247
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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248

against minorities. Justice O’Connor was explicit in her observation
that public employers should be encouraged to adopt voluntary, remedial, race-conscious policies to protect the civil rights of racial minorities when the employer deemed such policies necessary to afford
249
equal protection to minorities.
Justice O’Connor’s rationale helps explain why the majority in
Adarand and Croson adopted the strong-basis-in-evidence standard.
The strong-basis-in-evidence standard permits employers to take remedial race-conscious action without making themselves easier targets
for traditional discrimination lawsuits filed by rejected racial minori250
ties or “reverse discrimination” lawsuits filed by rejected whites.
Thus, in the contracting context, the Supreme Court has established
that the federal factual prerequisite for adopting a voluntary affirmative action policy is that a government entity that opts to consider race
in the contracting process must have evidence sufficient to create a
“strong basis” for the conclusion that the use of race-conscious meas251
In Croson,
ures is needed to remedy the effects of discrimination.
the Court observed that “[t]here is no doubt that ‘[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination’ un252
If presented with the question, it is likely that the
der Title VII.”
standard that the Court has articulated for assessing the federal constitutionality of voluntary, remedial affirmative action in noneducational contexts would also be applied to voluntary race-based affirmative action undertaken by a public university.
Although the Court has been generally disinclined over the last
several decades to identify government interests as sufficiently compel253
ling to justify the use of racial classifications, it has been willing to
248

See id. at 291 (arguing that a public employer need not make findings of contemporaneous discrimination before taking affirmative action under the remedial rationale).
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
See id. at 277 (majority opinion) (“[T]he trial court must make a factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”).
252
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (alteration in
original) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)).
253
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84 (finding that employer failed to establish legal
and factual predicate for race-conscious decision making in layoffs); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-20 (1978) (finding that the consideration of
race in medical school admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause despite the institution’s asserted interest in diversity).
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permit public employers to use race-conscious affirmative action policies to avoid Title VII employment discrimination liability. The logic
should extend to public universities seeking to avoid Title VI liability.
Accordingly, voluntary remedial efforts to achieve such compliance
are arguably sufficiently compelling to justify the narrowly tailored
consideration of race. A university seeking to use remedial affirmative
action to insulate itself from Title VI liability and the loss of Title VI
federal funds could invoke the Court’s analysis in Adarand and Croson.
However, in order for the Court to accept race-based admissions policies as remedial, the selective public university would have to be willing to argue that the remedial consideration of race in admissions is
not a preference for minorities but rather a corrective measure to
avoid federal civil rights claims.
Just as a university could argue that statistical evidence of Title VI
effect discrimination may, in certain circumstances, be sufficient to
justify remedial affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause,
an institution could take the position that such evidence of Title VI
racial effect discrimination is sufficient to demonstrate that the consideration of race in admissions is not a preference under state anti–
affirmative action laws. Using the same reasoning, the institution
could also invoke the federal-funding exception to state anti–
affirmative action laws on the ground that race-based affirmative action adopted for the remedial purpose of complying with Title VI federal regulations is legally permissible, even if it constitutes a racial
254
preference under state law. This is the framework under which public universities whose admissions cycles reveal statistically significant
racial disparities in admissions might argue that they have the authority, consistent with state anti–affirmative action law, to put the brakes
255
on an unjustified freefall in minority admissions.

254

Because it is likely that more states will adopt anti–affirmative action laws and
because it is possible that the current Supreme Court is prepared to reject the diversity
rationale for affirmative action, the answers to both questions are salient.
255
As a practical matter, educational institutions may, like employers and government entities, conduct disparity studies to justify remedial affirmative action. After
conducting the studies, affirmative action–less universities like UC Berkeley and UCLA
could readopt a limited form of race-conscious admissions without running afoul of
anti–affirmative action law. The institutions may point to the studies as proof that the
consideration of race does not confer a preference but instead ensures that college
performance ability is assessed fairly and adequately.
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C. Permissibility of Remedial Affirmative Action Under
State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws
Because the text of state anti–affirmative action laws leaves key
terms like “preference” and the meaning of the federal-funding exception open to substantial and varying interpretation, state courts
will play a central role in shaping the real-world impact of anti–
affirmative action laws. State courts that interpret the antipreference
provision of the state’s anti–affirmative action laws as an absolute ban
on the use of racial classifications, are, in essence, equating the term
256
preference with any race-conscious action. In contrast, a state court
may conclude that prohibiting racial preferences “does not ban all
257
government action that is cognizant of race.” This Article has identified another important legal question that state courts may eventually
consider—whether the use of race for the remedial purpose of correcting racial discrimination under the Title VI effect-discrimination theory
violates a particular state’s anti–affirmative action law. Again, the analytic framework for determining the state law constitutionality of remedial race-based affirmative action hinges upon how individual state
258
courts construe the central antipreference provision and the federal-funding provisions permitting race-conscious action that “must be
taken” by state government to “establish or maintain” federal fund259
ing.
The permissibility of affirmative action to remedy purposeful dis260
crimination has already been recognized by state courts. Assuming

256

See, e.g., Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating a state affirmative action statutory scheme applicable to the state lottery and the
sale of government bonds based on equal protection concerns).
257
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 164
(Wash. 2003). The California Supreme Court has come close to doing the former
while the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation reflects the latter approach. See
id. at 165 (“Given th[e] language [of the I-200 voters pamphlet], an average voter
would have understood that I-200 does not ban all affirmative action programs, and
would only prohibit the type of affirmative action we have described as ‘reverse discrimination’ or ‘stacked deck’ programs.”).
258
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
259
This is the federal-funding exception. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); see
also supra Section I.B. State anti–affirmative action laws also include an exception for
bona fide qualifications based on gender and for existing court orders and consent
decrees. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(c)–(d).
260
See, e.g., Coral Constr. Inc. v. City & County of San Fransisco, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d
781, 803 (Ct. App. 2007), appeal docketed, No. S152934 (Cal. Aug. 22, 2007) (“If a city or
other political subdivision were found to have engaged in intentional discrimination
such that some type of race-based remedial program was necessary under the federal
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that the Equal Protection Clause applies to remedial affirmative action
by public universities under the standard set forth in Adarand and Croson, state anti–affirmative action laws may permit remedial affirmative
action to correct disparate impact discrimination. Either by excluding
remedial affirmative action from the definition of preference or by
making the remedial use of race an exception to the general prohibition against using racial classifications, universities could urge that
state anti–affirmative action laws be interpreted to allow raceconscious measures when an institution needs to remedy Title VI effect discrimination. The state courts will likely find two questions central to this analysis: Does considering race in admissions to correct Title VI discriminatory effect constitute a preference under state anti–
affirmative action law? If the remedial consideration of race does
constitute a preference, is it a legal racial preference—made legally
permissible by the federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative
action laws?
1. Applying the Antipreference Provision to Test Deficiency
Assuming the Fourteenth Amendment permits institutions to use
race-conscious admissions policies for the remedial purpose of avoiding Title VI liability, in such a circumstance, remedial affirmative ac261
tion is simply “taking race into account [as] equalizing treatment.”
Public universities seeking to readopt remedial affirmative action
could argue that “rather than constituting a preference, affirmative
action programs function as corrective non-discriminatory meas262
ures.” In fact, decades before state anti–affirmative action laws were
conceived, Justice Powell, in his decision in Bakke, considered whether
race-based affirmative action to counteract limitations in the predictive ability of standardized tests like the SAT should be considered a
preference. Significantly, Powell concluded that “[t]o the extent that
race and ethnic background were considered [in selective university

Constitution, the supremacy clause as well as section 31 [of the California Constitution
(Proposition 209)] dictate that federal law prevails . . . .”).
261
Harris, supra note 46, at 711. Harris argues that, within the context of university admissions policies that rely on standardized tests of limited predictive ability, affirmative action is “a correction for the use of admissions criteria in which racial preferences are embedded.” Id.
262
Kimberle Crenshaw, Essay, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a Pro-Active Defense of
Affirmative Action, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 196, 212 (1999). Crenshaw argues that educational officials are incorrect to assume that they must eliminate their affirmative action
programs following the passage of Proposition 209.
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admissions] only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in
predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is no
263
Justice Powell's reasoning supports the argu‘preference’ at all.”
ment that considering race to “cure” limitations in the SAT's ability to
predict academic performance in not a racial preference.
Correcting or remedying test deficiency—established inaccuracies
in a test's predictive capacity—may be conceptualized in two ways under state anti–affirmative action laws. First, assuming that the primary
interest of a selective public university is to admit the best and brightest high-school students based on their academic merit without regard
to race, test deficiency unfairly undermines that goal. Thus, admissions that rely on deficient tests may actually be prohibited by the
264
antidiscrimination provision of state anti–affirmative action laws.
For instance, if a university like UC Berkeley has statistical evidence
that its affirmative action–less admissions policies have a racially discriminatory effect on African American and Latino applicants with the
265
requisite college performance ability to attend the institution, such
an institution may need to be race conscious in admissions to comply
with Proposition 209 and other state antidiscrimination laws as well as
to avoid charges, investigations, and the possible loss of federal funds
for failure to comply with federal Title VI disparate impact regulations.
Secondly, because anti–affirmative action laws explicitly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, there are strong textual and normative arguments that state courts should construe the term “preference” to exclude the use of race to correct Title VI effect discrimination.
Interpreting the antipreference provision of state anti–
affirmative action in this manner advances both the antidiscrimination requirements of state anti–affirmative action laws and the federal
antidiscrimination requirements embodied in laws like Title VI and its
263

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978). In the
context of the Bakke decision, Justice Powell’s observation had very significant implications. Justice Powell’s opinion suggests a willingness to apply something less stringent
than strict scrutiny to the use of race to compensate for the predictive limitations of
standardized tests like the SAT. Cf. Harris, supra note 46, at 710 (agreeing with Powell’s opinion in Bakke and stating that “what we call a preference depends on where we
mark a baseline”).
264
Professor Cheryl Harris has observed that “the consideration of race is only an
unfair preference if the underlying system is fair and does not enact a set of preferences for particular groups.” Harris, supra note 46, at 710; see also Crenshaw, supra
note 262, at 212 (“Indeed, Prop. 209 explicitly prohibits discrimination, and institutions are obligated to take measures to eliminate that discrimination.”).
265
This might be true of African American and Latino applicants with HSGPAs of
4.0 and higher. See supra subpart III.C.1.
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regulations. Moreover, even state courts that construe the antipreference provision of anti–affirmative action laws to be a per se ban on
race-conscious state action may interpret the federal-funding exception in a manner that gives universities the legal authority to use race
to correct for test deficiency. In other words, state courts may interpret the federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws
in a manner that permits institutions to be race conscious to cure inadequacies in the SAT's capacity to make useful distinctions as to the
relative college performance ability of racial minorities within a pool
of highly qualified applicants.
2. Interpreting the Federal-Funding Exception
The federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws
relaxes the laws’ antipreference requirements if the state needs to be
race conscious in order to remain eligible for federal funds. This exception, as included in current state anti–affirmative action laws, provides explicitly that the laws “do[] not prohibit action that must be
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, if in266
eligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.” On its
face, this exception grants explicit textual permission to the state government to adopt racial preferences in order to establish or maintain
federal funds. Accordingly, public universities seeking to adopt remedial affirmative action could urge state courts to interpret the
“must be taken” language as imposing a strong-basis-in-evidence standard similar to the federal standard for remedial affirmative action set
forth by the Court in Adarand.
Courts have held that the federal-funding exception eliminates
any potential conflict between state anti–affirmative action laws and
Title VI because the provision makes explicit that race-based policies,
including racial preferences, are permissible if needed to establish or
267
The rationale
maintain compliance with federal legal mandates.

266

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(6) (West
2008). The California law is worded slightly differently, without any substantive difference: “Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility
would result in a loss of federal funds to the State.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e).
267
See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 251
(6th Cir. 2006) (“What Title VI requires, in other words, Proposal 2 expressly allows—
eliminating any conflict between the two laws.”). Proposal 2 by its terms eliminates any
conflict between it and federal-funding statutes like Title VI. “This section,” the proposal says, “does not prohibit action that must be taken to establish or maintain eligi-
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that federal courts have adopted is that “what Title VI requires”—
“prevent[ing] discrimination in federally assisted programs”—the antipreference and federal-funding provisions of state anti–affirmative
268
action laws “expressly allow[].”
The rationale upon which federal courts have relied to conclude
that state anti–affirmative action laws are consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment should urge state courts to interpret anti–
affirmative action laws in a manner that best reinforces the purpose of
269
Permitting a public university with a strong basis in eviTitle VI.
dence that it needs to use race-conscious policies in order to comply
with a federal antidiscrimination mandate would seem to be a logical
application of the federal-funding exception and the interpretation
most consistent with the goals of Title VI. A public university’s use of
race to comply with the Title VI federal antidiscrimination mandate is
an example of a circumstance in which a state might permissibly invoke the federal-funding exception.
The purpose of the central provision of state anti–affirmative action laws is to establish a discrimination-free equilibrium in which minorities and nonminorities are treated fairly in public decision making. The overarching antidiscrimination purpose of anti–affirmative
action laws supports interpreting such laws’ explicit textual exceptions
in the manner most consistent with facilitating state compliance with
federal antidiscrimination laws. The purpose of the federal-funding
exception, according to the plain meaning of its text, is to identify one
such limited circumstance in which racial preferences remain legally
permissible—when failure to consider race would cause a state entity
to violate a federal mandate with which (as a recipient of federal
funds) the state is obligated to comply. In other words, the federal-

bility for any federal program, if ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to
the state.” MICH. CONST. art I, § 26(4). Title VI in turn says that “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
State anti–affirmative action laws have withstood federal preemption challenges to
their constitutionality based in large part on the text of the federal-funding exception.
The federal constitutionality of current state anti–affirmative action laws is contingent
upon holdings by federal courts that the provisions of state anti–affirmative action laws
do not impede a state’s ability to comply with Title VI.
268
Granholm, 473 F.3d at 251 (quoting Title VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964)) (first alteration in original).
269
See id. at 251-52 (“Proposal 2 reinforces [the] goal [of Title VI] by prohibiting
state universities from discriminating, or granting preferential treatment, on the basis
of race.”)
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funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws operates as a
safety valve that protects states that are subject to anti–affirmative action laws from losing federal funds for noncompliance with federal
civil rights laws like Title VI.
Professor Eugene Volokh has suggested a much different interpretation of the “must be taken” language of the federal-funding exception—that the exception only applies if the state demonstrates that
eligibility for the federal program is “genuinely necessary” because no
270
race-neutral action would preserve federal funding. Specifically, Volokh’s view is that
[t]he discriminatory conduct thus must be genuinely necessary for eligibility—it’s not enough that it be potentially helpful, or generally consistent with the spirit of the federal program. If it’s possible to be eligible
without the discrimination, then the discrimination is prohibited, because it’s not true that the action “must be taken” for eligibility. Likewise, if the state can switch to a nondiscriminatory program that will still
provide the federal funds, then the discriminatory conduct remains impermissible. In such a case, ineligibility for the discriminatory program
271
would not result in a loss of federal money.

State courts should reject this interpretation of the federal-funding
exception—that public entities must demonstrate that no race-neutral
action would satisfy the federal requirement. The primary reason that
Professor Volokh’s interpretation of the federal-funding exception
should be rejected is that the text of the exception, if so interpreted,
would have no practical effect. If state courts were to adopt Professor
Volokh’s interpretation of the federal-funding exception, it is likely
that no public entity would be able to invoke the provision. If the
federal-funding exception is interpreted to require that public univer-

270

See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1387 (1997). Professor Volokh did not consider any specific federal programs in interpreting the federal-funding exception:
I don’t know how many federal programs really require race or sex discrimination; the clause wasn’t added with any particular program in mind. It was
simply meant to foreclose any possible campaign argument that “[t]he CCRI
would cost California voters $X million in federal money,” based on some
program that opponents might have unearthed.
Id. (italics added) (alteration in original); see also Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr. & Travis
J. Lindsey, The Last Refuge of Official Discrimination: The Federal Funding Exception to California’s Proposition 209, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 458 (2004) (“[T]he proper interpretation of [the federal-funding] exception will be the most heated battleground over
the initiative’s enforcement.”).
271
Volokh, supra note 270, at 1387.
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sities demonstrate that it is literally impossible to conceive of a raceneutral means of complying with Title VI federal law, the provision
becomes superfluous. Moreover, such an interpretation would make
the exception inherently illogical. Like the other textual exceptions
272
set forth in state anti–affirmative action laws, the federal-funding exception makes legal what would otherwise constitute a “preference”
under the central antipreference provision of the law.
V. RESPONSIBILITY FOR RACIAL DISPARITY
Setting forth the analytic framework by which universities may readopt a remedial form of affirmative action is important because it
differentiates the legal constraints imposed on public universities by
state anti–affirmative action laws from the powerful, but nonlegal,
forces that “normalize” significantly lower minority admissions rates.
This Article makes it clear that admitting African American and Latino applicants at significantly lower rates than applicants of other
races is not mandated by state anti–affirmative action laws. The Article also identifies a circumstance when race-based affirmative action
may be permissible subsequent to the passage of a state anti–
affirmative action law—when a public university can viably argue that
a race-based admissions policy is adopted for the purpose of remedying Title VI discriminatory effect.
An affirmative action policy adopted to limit Title VI liability to
minorities would no doubt differ in degree from a diversity-justified
affirmative action policy. The scope of a remedial race-based affirmative action policy would be necessarily limited to race-consciousness
that would eliminate unjustified disparities in admissions rates that
federal courts deem evidence of a Title VI disparate impact violation
against qualified African American and Latino applicants. This reasoning does not apply to race-conscious action taken to achieve the
broader goal of racial diversity in higher education.
The empirical research in this Article establishes that racial disparities in admissions rates subsequent to the passage of state anti–
affirmative action laws have, in many instances, been of sufficient
magnitude to expose affirmative action–less universities to potential
Title VI liability. Institutions with a strong basis in evidence that their
reliance on the SAT would be difficult to justify as educationally necessary may be able to adopt a remedial affirmative action policy with-

272

See supra note 48.
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out violating state anti–affirmative action law. Specifically, universities
could justify the explicit consideration of race in admissions as a nonpreferential corrective use of race or as a legally permissible racial
preference under the federal-funding exception.
Thus, it may be that, before and after the passage of a state anti–
affirmative action laws, institutions retain the option to justify or to
remedy racial disparities in admissions that constitute a Title VI discriminatory effect. A university’s own normative assessment of
whether the racial gap in SAT scores is a product of minority deficiency or test deficiency will likely be the determinant factor in
whether state courts find a particular race-conscious policy remedial
and legally permissible. The analysis in this Article explains why institutions in states with anti–affirmative action laws retain the discretion
to evaluate their compliance with federal civil rights laws such as Title
VI. In so doing, universities may assess whether racial disparities in
admissions are the product of minority deficiency—deficiencies in the
college performance ability of certain racial groups—or the product
of test deficiency—limitations in the predictive capacity of a particular
admissions criterion such as the SAT. Thus, a selective public university’s view of the college performance ability of its state’s most qualified African American and Latino applicants will, in effect, determine
the permissibility of remedial race-based affirmative action under state
anti–affirmative action law.
CONCLUSION
In response to low African American admissions rates, one UCLA
professor asked the provocative question whether the number of new
African American students attending his institution had “to get to zero
273
When admissions of African Ameribefore we become outraged.”
cans later increased, a different UCLA professor made headlines when
he relied on that increase to support his charge that “UCLA is cheat274
By considering whether an extremely low ading on admissions.”
missions rate for certain racial groups justifies the use of race-based

273

Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., Pride and Shame at the School of a Black Hero, L.A. TIMES,
May 22, 2004, at B19. Gilliam wondered, in light of the steady post–Proposition 209
decline in the number of African American—and particularly African American
male—students, “How long will it be before [a bust of deceased UCLA alumnus] Ralph
Bunche is the last black person at UCLA?” Id.
274
TIM GROSECLOSE, REPORT ON SUSPECTED MALFEASANCE IN UCLA ADMISSIONS
AND THE ACCOMPANYING COVER-UP 1 (2008).
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affirmative action for the remedial purpose of avoiding Title VI liability, this Article provides an empirical and legal framework for evaluating which professor’s outrage is justified.
Affirmative action–less admissions policies adopted by several selective public universities to comply with anti–affirmative action laws
have resulted in racial disparities in admissions rates that could, if not
justified by “educational necessity,” satisfy the federal standard for a
prima facie case of Title VI disparate impact. This Article sets forth
the legal framework for evaluating a university’s assertion that its racebased affirmative action may not violate state anti–affirmative action
laws if the race-consciousness is remedial in nature. The Article also
asserts the normative claim that state anti–affirmative action laws
should be interpreted in the manner most likely to ensure that the
state’s most prestigious higher-education opportunities are fairly and
equally available to the state’s most qualified students of all races.
Viewing race-based affirmative action as a river of educational opportunity through which minority students gain access to premier public
universities, this Article demonstrates that state anti–affirmative action
laws need not necessarily act as dams. For universities that deem minority applicants sufficiently qualified, these laws may leave an open
channel to use race-conscious policies to remedy potential violations
of Title VI federal antidiscrimination law.

